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The second chapter of this PhD thesis examines the barriers to nonviolent resistance 
and explains why, despite the grievances, we see uprisings in some states and not 
others.  I argue that a lack of common ties and the existence of ethnic cleavages 
create additional barriers for nonviolent mass mobilization in ethnically diverse 
states.  I test the argument by using the Ethnic-Power Relations (EPR) and 
Nonviolent and Violent Campaign and Outcomes (NAVCO.2.0) datasets.  The results 
show that the probability of nonviolent campaign onset is conditional on both, the 
levels of ethnic diversity and the regime type – the onset being less likely in 
ethnically diverse non-democracies.   The third chapter illustrates how ethnic divides 
can be used to undermine mass-scale nonviolent mobilization by examining 
government framing of protest events during the 2014 spring protests in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  Automated text analysis approach is used to discover the types of 
narratives (frames) that the Bosnia and Herzegovina‘s government officials used to 
respond to protest demands.  The results show that the Government officials have 
predominantly used the following types of frames:  delegitimizing (ex. calling 
protesters traitors, hooligans), demobilizing (sympathetic statements – ex. saying that 
protests are justified), and alternative views (sidelining/ignoring grievances by 
discussing more salient issues).  The results indicate that ethnic divides were 
exploited to prevent cross-ethnic mass mobilization.   In the chapter four, I explore 
the variability of government responses to protest events using the Mass Mobilization 
Data (MMD), focusing on the ignore category - the response not commonly studied 
in the literature.   I find that contrary to the expectations, governments are more likely 
to ignore than repress protest events.   In particular, governments are more likely to 
 
 
ignore protests with 1000 or more participants, and more likely to accommodate than 
repress protests above 5000 participants.  In conclusion, this PhD thesis shows that 
ethnicity increases costs of cooperation and lowers potentials for nonviolent 
resistance.   In addition, this thesis demonstrates that governments might often choose 
to neither repress nor accommodate protest events, choosing instead to ignore 
grievances and demands.   In summary, the aim of this PhD thesis is to examine 
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If you can’t fly, run; if you can’t run, walk; if you can’t walk, crawl; but by all means keep 
moving.  Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr, Address at Spelman College, 10
th




People are the core of any collective action.  People power has been an important 
instrument of social and political change.  This term was coined to describe the anti-
regime protests in the Philippines when millions of people took to the streets to 
overthrow President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 (Ackerman and DuVall 2005).  Many 
oppressive, corrupt and ineffective governments around the globe have been toppled 
by unarmed, ordinary people seeking to challenge and change conditions in their 
communities.  These developments have led to an increase in scholarly interest in 
nonviolent resistance and collective action dilemmas.    
Individuals who engage in a civil resistance against a state often do so at a 
great personal risk.  Protest participants face repressive and unyielding regimes that 
resort to violence to suppress uprisings.  In addition to physical repression, protesters 
often encounter discrediting and undermining rhetoric or are repeatedly ignored by 
those in power (Bishara 2015).   Protesters also face numerous organizational barriers 
and collective action dilemmas that limit their ability to mobilize against a regime.  
Collective action dilemmas range from rational self-interest (Olson 2009), to a 
broader consideration of group goals, collective responsibility and wider societal 





the emergence of collective nonviolent resistance campaigns.  The thesis also 
examines a variety of state responses to dissent.     
Collective campaigns consist of ―time and space-bounded sets of activities 
oriented toward the same goal‖ (Marwell and Oliver 1984, p.1).  Unity of opinions 
and strategies as well as a large number of highly motivated participants is needed to 
initiate a collective civil resistance campaign against a regime.  In order to develop a 
common understanding of grievances and goals and mobilize large numbers, 
protesters cross existing political, social and cultural boundaries to garner more 
support for their cause (Smith et al 2015).  Those who voluntarily come together to 
act on a behalf of a larger collective do so either because they identify with an 
aggrieved social group, with a group‘s goal, or in some cases, with both 
(Klandermans 1999).  A sense of unity and common purpose facilitates coordination, 
cooperation and commitment needed to initiate nonviolent uprisings and successfully 
resist a more powerful regime apparatus.  The second and the third chapter of this 
thesis explore the conditions that affect potential for nonviolent resistance.   
The second chapter of this thesis examines the effects of ethnic boundaries on 
nonviolent campaign initiation in a cross-country sample of 109 large-scale 
nonviolent campaigns, using the information on campaigns collected by Chenoweth 
and Stephan (2011).  The data used in this chapter is described in section 1.2 
Overview of Research Chapters:  Datasets and Findings.  I rely on the definitions of 
Day et al.(2014, p.1) and Chenoweth and Lewis (2013, p.417) to define a nonviolent 
campaign a set of civilian-led, nonviolent, coordinated and purposive actions and 
events, involving 1000 or more participants.  I focus on this type of anti-regime 
action as it requires a great deal of coordination and strategic decision-making by 





Common ethnic ties facilitate collective action as ethnic groups provide 
informal social institutions that promote solidarity, common interests and aims 
(Humphreys et al. 2002).  Members of an ethnic group might find it easier to 
coordinate and interact with those who belong to their ethnic group and utilize their 
commonalities to overcome collective action dilemmas and barriers.  On the contrary, 
in cases where ethnic divides are present, people may lack a motivation to join others 
in an active struggle against a state regardless of the grievances and injustices that a 
regime imposes on its citizens.  Thus, the aim of the second chapter is to examine the 
role of ethnicity as a potential barrier for nonviolent campaign initiation.   
The third chapter of this thesis explores how ethnic divides can be used by 
government officials to undermine nonviolent mobilization.  The case of 2014 spring 
protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) provides insights into the Government‘s 
framing of protesters‘ grievances and goals, and the potential effects that framing can 
have on protest mobilization. The dataset used in this chapter was collected as 
described in section 1.2 Overview of Research Chapters; Datasets and Findings.   In 
this chapter I aim to accomplish the following: 1) explore the Government‘s framing 
of protest events using automated text analysis tools, 2) propose a categorization of 
government frames – something that is missing in the current literature on state 
responses to protest events, and 3) discuss potential effects of government framing on 
protest participation.  The discussion regarding the relationship between government 
frames and mobilization levels is based on the exploratory rather than confirmatory 
analyses.  The primary aim of this chapter is to uncover the types of discourses 
surrounding protest events (topics/frames) and propose a categorisation of 





The case of B&H is useful to study government framing of protest events 
given the ethnic divides and difficult economic conditions that have persisted since 
the end of the 1990s conflict.   It seemed for a moment that political and ethnic 
divides in B&H had vanished as a group of protesters took to the streets chanting ―we 
are hungry in three languages‖
1
suggesting that years of corruption have equally 
impoverished Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and others (Mackey 2014). Yet, despite the 
equally difficult economic situation in all parts of the country, with an unemployment 
rate of over 40%, the protests were mainly attended and organized by Bosniaks and 
Croats, while Serbs were largely absent from most protest events (Bjelajac 2014).  
Fear of domination by other ethnic group/s is still present in B&H where social and 
political life is largely organized along ethnic lines, preventing individuals from 
engaging across ethnic boundaries to address common grievances.   Each ethnic 
group is a dominant majority in their entity (and/or canton) and a fear of losing that 
power and level of political and cultural autonomy might have prevented cross-ethnic 
protest action.  The idea of majority nationalism (Loizides 2015) appears to drive 
these groups to compete to achieve larger sovereignty and greater control over the 
territory long after the end of the 1990s ethnic war.   
In divided and unequal societies, groups and individuals often become pitted 
against each other, constructing an image of self and other that ultimately minimizes 
and paralyzes their ability to effectively resolve issues at hand (Buskens et al. 2008; 
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  Before the ethnic conflict in 1990s the official language in Yugoslavia and all its republics, B&H 
included, was called Serbo-Croatian.  These two languages existed separately prior to the 
establishment of the Yugoslav Federation, but with the unification of Yugoslavia after the WWII, the 
language was referred to as Serbo-Croatian.  After the conflict was over in B&H, Bosnian Muslims 
(Bosniaks) have sought to define their own language, naming it Bosniak/Bosnian. Bosnian Serbs 
reverted to calling their language Serbian, and Croats calling theirs Croatian.  There are slight 
linguistic differences that emerged over time, but in actuality the three languages are interchangeable.  
So what protesters are saying here when they are saying that ―they are hungry in three languages‖, they 
are saying – ethnic differences, language differences and divides do not matter – what matters is that 
they are all equally impoverished by the corrupt and ineffective leadership by the Bosniak, Croat and 








    Some B&H government officials have exploited ethnic divides 
to undermine the 2014 protest events by claiming that the protests were a ploy by 
other ethnic group/s to seize power and destabilize the country (Oslobodjenje 
2014.b). The case of B&H illustrates the challenges that come with initiating 
nonviolent anti-regime campaigns in ethnically diverse societies.   
The case of B&H also provides insights into the Government‘s use of 
dismissive and discrediting rhetoric as an alternative to physical acts of repression.  In 
addition, the rhetorical alternatives to acts of accommodation such sympathetic 
statements made by some of the B&H officials are also examined.   In relation to the 
B&H regime‘s choice to ignore protest demands (no repression and no 
accommodation), I suggest that sidelining the main causes of grievances by proposing 
an alternative interpretation of issues and events closely corresponds to the acts of 
ignoring protests. I propose the following government frames categories: 
delegitimizing (ex. traitors), demobilizing (sympathetic statements), and alternative 
views (sidelining/ignoring grievances).  The variability in government responses to 
protest events is closely examined in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, including 
the choice to ignore protest demands which is rarely studied in the current protest 
literature.   
The fourth chapter provides a systematic empirical analysis of government 
responses to protest events in a cross-national sample of 161 independent states, using 
a dataset collected by Clark and Reagan (2016). The data used in this chapter is 
described in section 1.2 Overview of Research Chapters:  Datasets and Findings.  
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When faced with dissent, regimes seek to employ the least costly and most 
effective ways to respond to protest related threats. As some protests are more 
threatening than others, regimes‘ responses are likely to vary.  Even so, numerous 
studies have primarily focused on repression (Tilly 1978; Gurr 1986; Davenport 
2000; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Hendrix and Salehyan 2016).  Davenport 
(2007) firmly claims that repression is an expected response to protests and suggests 
that the relationship is the most consistent finding in the protest literature – coining it 
the Law of Coercive Responsiveness.  If repression is to be expected, then a fear of 
violence and a lack of trust in government will lower people‘s expectations that a 
change is possible through protests (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, p.4).  This 
type of claim could shape a policy debate and encourage governments to pass more 
restrictive and repressive measures to prevent dissent.  In such cases government 
repression can present another major barrier for nonviolent mass mobilization. Thus, 
it is important to examine and evaluate if and how the Law of Coercive 
Responsiveness helps explain governments‘ actions towards protesters.  Other 
researchers take a less definite stand and propose that repression increases with an 
increase in threat levels, referring to this view as a threat-response theory (Earl, 
Soule, and McCarthy 2003).  The fourth chapter contributes to the current literature 
as it broadens the theoretical discussion on what constitutes a threat by incorporating 
a state‘s choice to ignore or accommodate protests in addition to their use of 
repression.    
The threat-response theory suggests that the probability of repression 
increases/decreases relative to protest threat levels (Tilly, 1978; Gartner and Regan 
1996; Poe et al 2000; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003).  This theoretical framework 





consideration. What do governments do when protest threats are low?  Is it in a 
regime‘s best interest to primarily rely on repression to reduce threat to its power? 
These and similar questions are addressed in the fourth chapter in detail.   
Repression is not the only available choice that regimes can use to respond to 
dissent – protests can be also ignored and/or accommodated (Klein and Regan 
forthcoming).   The ignore category, in particular, has been greatly overlooked in the 
current protest literature.  I take both, the accommodation and the ignore category 
into consideration and examine these in the context of the threat-response theory.  
Overall, the primary aim of the fourth chapter is to contribute to the current literature 
on dissent by evaluating how protest event attributes such as protest size and demands 
shape a government‘s perceived levels of threat and a choice to ignore, accommodate 
or repress protest events. 
The following section provides a more detailed discussion of protest attributes 
and government responses.   
 
1.1 Protest Attributes and Government Responses  
 
Grievances such as social and political injustices, regimes‘ repressive and 
discriminatory policies or economic strife are often cited as a source of unrest.   Some 
protests emerge as spontaneous reactions to injustices, while others are a part of a 
larger, strategic, purposive, long-lasting and well-organized anti-government 
campaign.  Anti-regime uprisings that develop goal-oriented, strategic and 
coordinated actions are better equipped to demand and succeed in their calls for 
policy change, regime reform, or even regime removal.  The second chapter focuses 





nonviolent campaigns.  Nonviolent campaigns link various campaign events 
(individual protests and less visible actions such as planning during winter months) to 
capture ongoing, purposive and organized efforts to confront a regime (Chenoweth 
and Stephan 2011).  The third chapter of this thesis examines government responses 
(framing/rhetoric) to much smaller, less organized and primarily spontaneous protest 
events.  The data used in the fourth chapter includes both, small and large-scale 
protest events, with a semi-organized structure, placing this data somewhere in the 
middle between the large-scale nonviolent campaigns and small-scale spontaneous 
events. Thus, this thesis examines a diverse set of protest events that vary in the terms 
of their organizational level.   
In order to effectively oppose a more powerful regime apparatus, protest activists 
need to be able to mobilize a large number of highly motivated individuals who can 
articulate their demands in a clear manner.  The larger the protest size and the more 
demanding the claims are, the more likely the regime will take notice and seek ways 
to undermine and quash uprisings.  Protest participation levels and the types of 
demands shape governments‘ perceived levels of threat and a choice to repress, 
accommodate or ignore calls for a change.   
Government responses to protest events exemplify people‘s struggle over the 
rights and access to political power.  The current protest literature provides some 
insights into a regime‘s use of repression towards protests that pose a higher level of 
threat, but it greatly overlooks the possible use of other types of responses.  In 
particular, the conditions that underlie a state‘s choice to ignore dissent are largely 
left unexplored and unexplained in the current protest literature.   
While motives for uprisings are numerous, in particular in  non-democratic 





cooperation needed for nonviolent mass mobilization.  In cases where salient ethnic 
cleavages heighten the inherent societal distance that already exists in repressive 
states, the possibility of nonviolent collective action may decrease.  Nonviolent 
protests may fail to emerge for numerous reasons.  The second and third chapter of 
this thesis suggests that nonviolent campaigns or small-scale peaceful protests do not 
emerge as often in some states, despite high levels of grievances, because ethnic 
divides affect levels of cooperation and coordination across various ethnic groups.  
Thus, a common understanding of grievances and goals can help people to overcome 
collective action barriers and demonstrate people power in ways that could be 
beneficial for a larger collective.  
The following sections provide a more detailed overview of research chapters; 
the datasets and the findings.  This section is followed by a brief thesis outline.    
 
1.2 Overview of Research Chapters: Datasets and Findings  
 
The second chapter addresses the question of people being more or less willing to join 
others in a nonviolent, collective struggle against a state and to what extent ethnic ties 
affect their decision to participate in an uprising.  The reasoning behind this question 
stems from conflict and economics literature.  Conflict literature often links ethnicity, 
in particular, salient ethnic divides and violent conflict (Posner 2004; Cederman et al. 
2010; Gubler and Selway 2012; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013).  Economics 
literature suggests that ethnic diversity makes it more difficult to achieve collective 
action and produce collective goods (see, e.g., Alesina and LaFerrara 2005).  There 
also appears to be a lower level of trust and participation in ethnically diverse 





homogenous societies, where common identity facilitates unity and motivates people 
to engage in collective action (Putnam, 2007; Posner, 2004; Alesina and LaFerrara, 
2000).   
Much of the focus in the literature on ethnicity has been on the relationship 
between ethnicity and violent conflict, and less so on the relationship of between 
ethnicity and nonviolent uprisings.  Thus, given the potential role that ethnicity may 
play in political organization, the second chapter contributes to the current literature 
on dissent by testing ethnicity related propositions in relation to the onset of 
nonviolent campaigns.  
The findings in the second chapter indicate that the negative effect of ethnicity 
on the onset of nonviolent campaigns is conditional on the regime type, with the 
probability of an onset being least likely in ethnically diverse non-democracies.  
Ethnicity alone does not represent a significant barrier for nonviolent campaign onset, 
however, in non-democratic regimes, where rights are limited and groups are pitted 
against each other, ethnicity becomes a barrier.  
The second chapter utilizes the Nonviolent and Violent Campaign and Outcomes 
(NAVCO 2.0) dataset, with a primary focus on the onset of nonviolent campaigns 
during 1945-2006 (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).  The advantage of the NAVCO 
2.0 dataset is that it provides an opportunity to study large-scale, coordinated 
campaigns against a government that involve 1000 or more people.  These types of 
large-scale, sustained nonviolent campaigns are likely to involve individuals from 
various societal groups.  Chenoweth and Lewis report (2013) that the majority of the 
NAVCO 2.0 campaigns are ethnically diverse (p.421). Cooperation across a diverse 





campaign.  Thus, this dataset is well suited to examine the emergence of nonviolent 
collective action and the effects of ethnic diversity on these types of events.   
While the NAVCO 2.0 dataset provides extensive and useful information on 
campaign characteristics, it lacks detailed information on government responses to 
uprisings.  The NAVCO 2.0 dataset codes a government‘s use of repression, but from 
the perspective of the opposition campaign and not a state (Chenoweth and Stephan 
2011).  It also codes the government response as a dichotomous variable, yes – no 
repression; a state‘s use of repression versus a combination of a state not responding 
and/or state conceding.  Thus, this data is not suitable for examining variability in 
state responses to nonviolent anti-regime campaigns, which is the aim of the fourth 
chapter of this thesis.  The other disadvantage of the NAVCO 2.0 dataset is that it 
does not code periods of lower level contention that precedes the onset of nonviolent 
campaigns with 1000 or more participants.  Thus, using the NAVCO2.0 dataset it is 
not possible to examine if and how government responses to smaller-scale protest 
events may present a barrier for nonviolent campaign initiation.  Information that is 
not present in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset is coded in the Mass Mobilization Data (MMD 
data; Clark and Regan 2016; for detailed discussion see Klein and Regan, 
forthcoming).  The MMD data is used in the fourth chapter to further examine the 
relationship between protest characteristics and government responses.  
 The primary contribution of the second chapter is to offer insight into the 
effects of ethnicity on nonviolent conflict.  Another important contribution of the 
second chapter is the use of Ethnic-Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Cederman et al. 
2010) to estimate the levels of ethnic diversity while taking into account the salience 
of ethnic categories.  The EPR dataset provides more precise and up-to date 





(monopoly or exclusion) for all relevant groups in 157 countries between 1946-2014 
(Cederman et al. 2010, p.14; Vogt et al. 2015).  The EPR dataset has been proven to 
offer a more suitable measure of ethnic diversity as it captures the salience of ethnic 
categories. While some earlier studies have primarily relied on demographic 
characteristics to test a relationship between ethnicity and conflict occurrence (see 
Posner 2004 for a detailed review), the recent works suggest that ethnicity may matter 
more when, for instance, large portions of the population are excluded from power 
sharing on the basis of ethnic belonging (see, e.g.,Wimmer et al. 2009; Cederman, 
Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). 
 The third chapter examines the rhetoric and the language (framing) that 
regime officials use to respond to protest events.  The protest framing literature 
defines frames as strategic, simple and meaningful ideas, developed and deployed to 
achieve a specific purpose (Snow and Benford 1988; Benford and Snow 2000, p.624).  
The protest framing literature has developed an extensive scholarly work on the 
framing processes, but primarily from the protest activists‘ perspective.  The frames 
proposed by government officials are rarely explored in social movement and 
government response literature.  The findings in this chapter show that the 
government officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) engaged in strategic framing 
of protest events relying on the following frames: delegitimizing (ex. calling 
protesters traitors, hooligans), demobilizing (sympathetic statements – ex. saying that 
protests are justified), and alternative views (sidelining/ignoring grievances by 
discussing more salient issues). This chapter contributes to the literature by 
examining government framing of protest events and proposing a categorization of 





The analysis in this chapter focuses on the case of the B&H 2014 spring 
protests and the Government officials‘ verbal responses to these events.  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (B&H) is an example of a country where political and social life is 
largely divided along ethnic lines.  Territorial and ethnic divides present a barrier for 
greater cross-ethnic cooperation.  After the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) the 
country was divided into 3 administrative units: Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (FB&H), Republic of Srpska (RS) and Brčko District (BD).  The FB&H 
is mainly inhabited by Bosnian Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, while the RS is mainly 
inhabited by Bosnian Serbs (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014).  Ethnic divides, post-
conflict issues and the DPA bureaucratic structures have negatively affected 
economic recovery, with estimates that every 6
th
 citizen in B&H is living below the 
poverty line (Dedic 2013; p.2; Ceriani and Ruggeri 2015).  Regardless of the high 
levels of economic grievances, anti-regime protests on a national or cross-entity level 
are rare.   
The 2014 spring protests were the largest mobilization of people since the end 
of the 1990s conflict.  Even so, the protests primarily emerged in the FB&H and did 
not spill over to the RS entity.  The differences in the framing by the FB&H and the 
RS officials could help explain the differences in the levels of mobilization in the two 
entities.  The findings show that the FB&H political leaders have used both 
sympathizing and delegitimizing frames, while the RS government mainly framed the 
protests as a threat to the RS autonomy.  The RS government‘s strategy to evoke a 
more salient issue such as the RS autonomy may help explain why Bosnian Serbs did 
not join Bosnian Bosniaks and Croats to address grave economic and political 





 The methods that I have used to study government frames are exploratory 
rather than confirmatory, and so the relationship between government frames and 
mobilization levels is primarily explored in descriptive terms.  The primary aim of 
this chapter was to categorize government frames given the lack of attention in the 
current literature regarding the government‘s verbal response to protest events.  I 
have relied on automated text analysis, structural topic modelling methods, to 
discover framing structures and the language used by the Government officials to 
respond to protests.   
I extracted the data from the INFOBIRO, the first, the only and the most 
extensive digital database of all B&H news reports over the last 50 years (INFOBIRO 
2015).  I manually downloaded all the articles that were published from January to 
April 2014 using regular expressions to identify protest related articles.  I focused on 
the major daily B&H newspaper sources, Oslobodjenje and Nezavisne Novine.  I 
manually reviewed all the articles and decided to only include news articles from the 
month of February (N=863) given that protests in other months were rare.  
Belgioioso, Gleditsch and Vidović (2017) also found that the protests primarily 
emerged in the month of February, and their dataset includes a wider range of 
sources, including international sources and video recordings posted by activists 
online.  The analysis was then performed using automated text analysis methods 
developed by Roberts et al.(2015).  One of the advantages of this dataset (corpus of 
text) is that it contains information based on local sources, Oslobodjenje is based in 
the FB&H entity, and Nezavisne Novine is based in the RS.  The disadvantages that 
come with using local news sources is that it presents a challenge to verify the 
findings (compare human coding of text to automated text analysis).  In addition, it 





developed and tested using English language sets of texts.  However, this is becoming 
less of a challenge with political scientists developing language specific algorithms.   
The final analysis chapter in this thesis, chapter four, explores the variability 
in government responses to protest events.   The main aim of the chapter is to explore 
conditions that underlie a government‘s choice to respond to protests either by 
repressing, accommodating or ignoring uprisings.  The rationale and the motivation 
for this question stems from the realization that the current literature on dissent 
primarily focuses on the use of repression, and disregards other types of responses, in 
particular the ignore category.   
The findings in this chapter indicate that contrary to the expectations and the 
Law of Coercive Responsiveness claims, the ignore option is the most common 
government response.   The idea that repression is the dominant strategy is not 
supported by the results in this study.  The results in this chapter also show that the 
probability of ignoring increases as the protest size increases, contradicting another 
view in the literature, the threat-response theory, which states that repression 
increases with an increase in threat levels (increase in the number of protest 
participants). 
I was able to conduct the analyses described in the fourth chapter of this thesis 
by relying on the Mass Mobilization Data (MMD), the first and only dataset that 
codes several types of government responses (Clark and Reagan 2016).  The MMD 
provides information on protest events and government responses for 161 countries 
between 1990-2014.   
There are several advantages to using the MMD to study government 
responses.  First, the MMD codes independent protest events with a threshold of 50 





smaller-scale protest events with fewer than 1000 participants (NAVCO 2.0 
threshold). This is helpful for understanding if and how government responses 
present a barrier for an emergence of larger, coordinated and sustained efforts of civil 
resistance (types of events studied in the Chapter 2).  The MMD data also codes 
large-scale protest events (10 000 and above), which helps me examine governments‘ 
perceptions of threat levels and their choice of action when responding to small 
versus large-scale protest events.   
The one disadvantage of the MMD data is the coding of the protest violence 
variable.  The MMD codes protesters engaging in violence as a dichotomous variable, 
with one being any type of violence from riots to destruction of property to shooting 
at the police (Clark and Regan 2016).  As I am primarily interested in strategic 
nonviolent mobilization (both small and large-scale mobilization levels), it would 
have been useful to have information if the use of violence was strategic on the part 
of the protesters or if the violence was instigated by provocateurs not associated with 
the protest campaign.  I deal with this disadvantage of the data by controlling for 
protest violence since a regime is more likely repress violent protests.  Overall, the 
MMD data provides a useful framework for examining variety of government 
responses and further testing of the dominant theoretical frameworks such as the Law 
of Coercive Responsiveness and the threat-response theory.   
 
 
1.3 The PhD Thesis Outline 
 
The second chapter explores how and to what extent ethnic divisions affect 
potentials for nonviolent mass mobilization.  The findings confirm that ethnicity 
presents a barrier for nonviolent mass mobilization in non-democratic states, with the 





diverse non-democracies.  The third chapter focuses on investigating ways in which 
ethnic divides can be exploited by government officials who aim to undermine 
dissent.  The findings illustrate that the existence of ethnic divides during the 2014 
protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina played a role in the Government‘s framing of 
protest events in this case.  The fourth chapter extends the current literature on dissent 
by examining variability in government responses, and finds that contrary to the 
expectation, governments are more likely to ignore than repress or accommodate 
protests.  In the final chapter, the conclusion, I discuss the implications of my 




































































Are people more or less willing to collectivise on the basis of ethnic ties?  While 
collective action dilemmas exist in both, ethnically homogenous and heterogeneous 
societies, the obstacles to nonviolent mass mobilization differ.  We argue that a lack 
of common ties and the existence of ethnic cleavages create additional barriers for 
nonviolent mass mobilization in ethnically diverse states.  Salient ethnic cleavages 
can negatively affect levels of cooperation and coordination and lower potentials for 
nonviolent resistance.  Ethnicity has been primarily studied with regard to violent 
conflict and rarely considered in relation to nonviolent uprisings.  This chapter 
examines the effects of ethnicity on nonviolent campaign initiation by using the 
Ethnic-Power Relations (EPR, 1946-2014) and Nonviolent and Violent Campaign 
and Outcomes (NAVCO.2.0, 1945-2006) datasets.  Our results show that the 
probability of nonviolent campaign onset is conditional on both, the levels of ethnic 
diversity and the regime type.  The findings support our main argument that the 
nonviolent campaign onset is less likely in ethnically diverse non-democracies.  This 
chapter provides theoretical and empirical contributions to the current literature on 
nonviolent resistance by taking into account ethnic group relations and examine how 












2. 1 Introduction 
 
As workers, church leaders and elites joined their forces to peacefully resist 
Communist rule in Poland and other neighbouring states in 1980s, anti-Communist 
resistance in Yugoslavia was lacking.  Nonviolent mass demonstrations in ethnically 
homogenous Poland and Hungary led to the collapse of Communist rule and 
democratic transition.   In contrast, limited calls for political pluralism in multiethnic 
Yugoslavia (Cox 2004) evoked ethnic grievances and nationalist political agendas 
that led to breakup of the country and eventually civil war in several of its republics.  
Did common ethnic ties facilitate greater solidarity and coordination among the 
members of the Polish nonviolent resistance movement?  Is it easier to solve 
collective action dilemmas in ethnically homogenous societies in comparison to 
ethnically heterogeneous societies?  We argue that ethnic groups provide informal 
social institutions that facilitate collective action by promoting solidarity, common 
interests and aims (Humphreys et al. 2002).   On the contrary, a lack of common ties 
and the existence of ethnic cleavages create additional barriers for nonviolent mass 
mobilization in ethnically diverse states.  Salient ethnic cleavages can negatively 
affect levels of cooperation and coordination and, thus, lower potentials for 
nonviolent resistance.   
We test our argument empirically by using the Nonviolent and Violent 
Campaign and Outcomes (NAVCO 2.0) dataset from which we extract information 
on the onset of nonviolent campaigns during 1945-2006 (Chenoweth and Stephan 
2011).   We also use the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset to obtain a measure of 
ethnic diversity that best captures the ethnic power relations between relevant ethnic 





knowledge, this is the first paper that considers ethnicity as a potential barrier for 
nonviolent campaign initiation.   
Public gatherings and protest marches are the most common civil resistance 
tactics used to publicly and openly express grievances and demands against a 
government.   Protest events can be characterized as nonviolent, violent or a mixture 
of both.  The focus of this chapter is on nonviolent uprisings.  In particular, we focus 
on the emergence of nonviolent campaigns that require coordinated and persistent 
efforts and involve large numbers of people.  These types of events are likely to 
involve individuals from various societal groups.  Thus, by examining large-scale 
nonviolent uprisings coded in NAVACO 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), 
we are able to test to what extent ethnic diversity affects coordination, cooperation 
and commitment needed for the emergence of large-scale nonviolent campaigns.  The 
term nonviolent campaign refers to a set of civilian-led, nonviolent, coordinated and 
purposive actions, initiated by unarmed persons who have chosen to engage in an 
active struggle against a state (Day et. al 2014, p.1).    
Protests often emerge as a rallying call against oppression, corruption and 
poverty in a society.  People join protest events either when they identify with an 
aggrieved social group, with groups‘ demands, or in some cases with both 
(Klandermans 1999).  Studies have shown that people are more likely to support an 
action against a government if they share a common and psychologically meaningful 
bond with others (see Thomas et al. 2009, p.196; Humphreys et al. 2002, for a 
detailed review).  When people relate to each other and share a common vision, they 
are more likely to join a campaign, and subsequently, more likely to succeed by 





Ethnicity plays a relevant role in political organization. Members of ethnic 
groups relate through linguistic, religious or cultural norms and often rely on groups‘ 
informal social institutions to coordinate their actions (Humphreys et al. 2002).  
Common ethnic ties enhance coordination and goal-oriented struggle, which are the 
pre-requisite for nonviolent campaign emergence. While political psychology 
literature demonstrates that social identities play an important role in collective action 
(Smith et al 2014; Thomas and Louis 2013; McGarty et al. 2014), ethnicity related 
propositions are yet to be systematically tested in the nonviolent resistance literature.  
In general, ethnicity is mainly explored in relation to violent mobilization and is less 
understood in the context of nonviolent uprisings.  Thus, in this chapter we contribute 
to the current literature by examining how ethnicity affects nonviolent mobilization.   
In order to effectively challenge unyielding and repressive regimes, nonviolent 
campaign participants need to reach a certain level of agreement, coordination and 
commitment. Solving complex collective action dilemmas might be easier in 
ethnically homogeneous states, presuming that common ethnic identity instils a 
greater sense of common purpose and motivates people to come together to act on 
behalf of a larger collective (Marwell and Oliver 1984, p.16; Hardin and Higgins 
1996; Opp 2009).  Coordination and cooperation may be difficult in diverse societies, 
in particular when ethnic divides prevent people from developing overarching 
identities and aims that go beyond ethnic boundaries. Recent anti-government 
uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa illustrate the dilemmas protesters face 
when seeking to remove oppressive and corrupt regimes in ethnically diverse states.  
For instance, the decision by the Sunni majority to confront Assad‘s oppressive 
regime in 2011 might have been perceived by others as Sunni‘s attempt to institute 





affected the Syrian nonviolent movement and it eventually led to a violent and 
devastating civil war.  The case of Syria indicates that a motivation to address 
economic and political inequalities can be overshadowed by ethnic divides and 
diverging interests, lessening the potential for a widespread, nonviolent mobilization.   
The scope of the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa was largely 
unexpected despite the fact that people in these regions have long suffered under 
autocratic rule.   The repressive nature of these autocratic regimes as well as a lack of 
responsiveness to protesters‘ demands in the past have negatively affected people‘s 
expectations that a change is possible (see for ex. Egypt case study, Bishara 2015).  
Autocracies, when compared to democracies, are more effective in preventing 
protests, less likely to accommodate protest demands and more likely to employ 
repression (Carey 2006).  Even though autocracies exert greater control over their 
population, grievances stemming from unequal distribution of wealth and power and 
identity-based discrimination act as a motivating factor, and rebellions do emerge 
despite unfavorable conditions (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015).  Nonetheless, 
economic and political grievances are not always sufficient to evoke large-scale 
nonviolent resistance.  Despite the difficult economic and political conditions across 
the Middle East and North Africa, protests did not emerge in all the states in the 
region, and have also greatly differed in the terms of the type, the size, the tactics and 
the outcomes (White et al. 2015).  Given the grievances in non-democracies, ethnic 
divisions could to some extent explain why we see the onset of nonviolent campaigns 
in some non-democratic states but not in others.  The levels of cooperation and 
coordination needed for nonviolent campaign initiation may be difficult to achieve in 






Even in anocracies, years of economic inequality and poverty do not often lead to 
the emergence of large-scale nonviolent anti-regime campaigns (ex Latin American 
states – see Appendix 6.1).  This is puzzling, since anocracies, the types of the 
regimes that are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic, could potentially be 
more susceptible to uprisings due to political and institutional instability as well as a 
lower likelihood of violent repression in these types of regimes.   It is possible that, 
instead of relying on violent repression, anocracies employ cooptation, offering rents 
to various societal groups in exchange for their support (Gandhi and Vreeland 2004).  
Both, autocracies and anocracies employ various strategies to ‗conquer and divide‘ an 
opposition – all with one aim – to prevent challenges to their power and demobilise 
masses.  Thus, in this paper we focus on examining the effect of ethnic divides in 
non-democratic regimes.      
In the following sections, we highlight the gap in the current literature on 
ethnicity and nonviolent mobilization and develop a theory on how and under which 
conditions ethnicity may affect nonviolent struggle.    
 
2.2 Ethnicity, Nonviolence and Potentials for Change  
 
Ethnic demography, a relatively static and stable structural factor, has often been 
linked to a number of dynamic political outcomes.  The Ethnic Diversity Index is 
used to capture the religious, linguistic and/or racial demographic characteristics of a 
country (Alesina et al. 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).  It measures the 
probability that two individuals randomly drawn from the overall population belong 
to different ethnic/religious/racial groups.  This index has been actively used to test 





performance, democratic consolidation and public goods provision among others 
(Horowitz 1985; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Alesina et al. 2003; Alesina and 
LaFerrara 2005; Merkel and Weiffen 2012; Schaeffer, 2013).  The current literature 
offers some insights into social and political conditions under which ethno-nationalist 
mobilization leads to violent conflict (e.g. the emergence of terrorist or rebel groups).  
Even though the precise mechanism through which such violence emerges is not well 
understood (Cederman et al. 2010, p.7), ethnicity is often used to explain onset of 
violent conflict.  This is mainly due to inadequacies in the data and the measures used 
to capture the most relevant features that connect ethnicity to particular socio-political 
outcomes.   
The studies that take into account the extent to which ethnic demography goes 
together with political or economic marginalization are better able to capture the 
depth of the divisions and the conditions under which ethnic cleavages increase the 
risk of civil wars (Cederman et al. 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013; 
Gubler and Selway 2012) or negatively effect on economic performance (Posner 
2004).  It has not been until recently that scholars have begun to examine ethnic 
group relations beyond ethnographic characteristics. The Ethnic-Power Relations 
(EPR) dataset (Cederman et al. 2010) is the first project to collect information on 
ethnic groups‘ access to political representation, adding an important dimension to the 
existing demographic measures of ethnicity.    The EPR has information at the group 
level for 758 distinct ethnic groups and their access to state power between 1946-
2014 (Cederman et al. 2010, p.14; Vogt et al. 2015).  We use the EPR data in this 
chapter to calculate the measure of ethnic diversity that captures ethnic power 





Existing research has primarily focused on exploring the links between ethnic 
marginalization and the risk of violent challenges against the state, in particular 
separatist civil wars.  In comparison, there has been less effort to understand the 
effects of ethnicity on the initiation of nonviolent campaigns.  Studies have shown 
that nonviolent campaigns tend to be urban based, non-sectarian, and typically 
directed against authoritarian governments. Despite the overall non-sectarian 
character of nonviolent campaigns, we know little about the conditions under which 
ethnic cleavages constrain actors to mount nonviolent challenges against the 
government.  In cases where ethnic differences are exploited and politicized, the 
possibility for nonviolent collective action may be low given the negative effect of 
salient ethnic cleavages.  Ethnicity may play more of a role in non-democratic and 
poor states where the regime either lacks resources to include all groups or where 
ethnic favouritism is encouraged to ensure the dominance of one‘s own group 
regardless of the available resources (Wimmer et al. p. 321).  In such societies, 
loyalty to a particular ethnic identity may become more important than a need to 
improve social and political conditions for all (Wright 2009 p.865).  Potentials for 
collective action may be low in non-democratic states that promote this type of ethnic 
politics.   
A great deal of politics is nonviolent, which in turn raises questions about how 
nonviolent alternatives to violent conflict are best conceptualized as contentious 
activities.  Once the need for a change in governance is recognized and expressed, 
people can either pursue their goals via official channels such as elections if possible 
or express their claims outside of the government sanctioned protocols. Following 
Sharp‘s (1973) efforts to catalogue nonviolent forms of resistance (see e.g. Bond, 





between routine politics (i.e., carried out within the conventions of a political system 
such as forming parties), convention breaking forms of direct action that entail either 
acts of commission (i.e., doing something that the government tries to prevent people 
from doing, such as demonstrations) or acts of omission (i.e., refusing to do 
something that the government orders people to do, such as tax boycotts).  In 
addition, some nonviolent campaigns tend to engage in creating alternative 
institutions to set a stage for easier transition or to prevent conflict escalation.  A good 
example of this is the work of the Regional Command Councils in Syria, where both 
civilian and armed groups have worked together to create an alternative local 
governance by establishing an underground clinic system, an alternate economy, 
schools, media, and transportation system (Bartkowski and Kahf 2013).   
Most analyses of nonviolent direct action had been either case-specific or 
focused only on a small number of cases (e.g., Schock 2005), but systematic 
comparative analyses have been greatly advanced by the NAVCO 2.0 dataset 
(Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).  This dataset contains information on cross-country, 
large-scale maximalist campaigns that reflect incompatibilities against the central 
government or territory, providing a useful comparison to data on civil wars.  
NAVCO 2.0 dataset, counts 109 nonviolent and 142 violent onsets of major 
resistance campaigns, during the 1945-2006 period, with nonviolent campaigns 
becoming more frequent in the recent decades, in particular after the 1980s 
(Chenoweth and Lewis 2013).  This excludes nonviolent direct action over policy 
issues such as the environment or same-sex rights, which may be common, but 
normally have no corresponding referents in the violent domain, at least not on the 





exclusive, but the campaigns are characterized as either ―primarily violent‖ or 
―primarily nonviolent‖ in NAVCO 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013).  
The current literature also tends to focus on the relative effectiveness of observed 
nonviolent campaigns (see Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), with much less emphasis 
on the onset or the sorts of contexts that are more likely to see campaigns break out 
(with some exceptions, ex. Dahl et al. 2014; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015).  Dahl et 
al. (2014) develop a theory of nonviolent action highlighting the mobilization 
advantages of nonviolent direct mobilization for large constituencies or political 
groups, given the lower barriers for nonviolent mobilization in such cases, as the 
government is less likely to successfully exert control over a large population.  In our 
case, ethnic homogeneity (a lack of ethnic diversity) would indicate that one large, 
homogenous ethnic group could carry mass mobilization on their own more 
effectively when compared to numerous ethnic groups.  Furthermore, consistent with 
the idea that resources are important for collective action and the ability to target the 
government through non-cooperation, Dahl et al. (2014) also find that campaigns are 
much more likely in countries with an urban population where individuals can be 
mobilized in the capital, with the highest likelihood of nonviolent campaigns in more 
urbanized autocracies.  It is important to note that the presence of news media and the 
levels of reporting differ between urban and rural regions, so it is also possible that 
the nonviolent campaigns are underreported in the rural settings. Urbanization, as an 
important resource mobilization factor is taken into consideration in the current paper.   
Nonviolent campaigns represent a great threat to the survival of autocratic 
regimes, with nonviolent campaigns being twice as successful in overthrowing a 
regime in comparison to violent anti-regime campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 





campaigns have played a major role in toppling a long-lasting, authoritarian, 
personalist rule of Suharto (1967-1998) in Indonesia and Marcos (1965-1986) in the 
Philippines despite violent government repression (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).  
Interestingly, while both campaigns were successful in removing these regimes, 
opposition in the more ethnically homogenous Philippines seemed to be better 
organized and more cohesive in comparison to the opposition in the more ethnically 
diverse Indonesia (Aspinall 2005).  It is possible that the Philippine‘s religious and 
cultural homogeneity has served as a basis upon which various political parties and 
organizations were able to come together to oppose Marco‘s regime in 1983 in a more 
organized manner. The emergence of a nonviolent campaign in the more ethnically 
diverse Indonesia in 1997 suggests that despite the high levels of ethnic diversity and 
autocracy, successful nonviolent mass mobilization is still possible.  In the case of 
Indonesia, a student-led, sustained and increasingly institutionalized nonviolent 
campaign was able to eventually build a large and diverse network of individuals and 
organizations, and successfully confront the regime as Indonesia was facing a 
massive economic crisis in 1997 (Boudreau 2000).  It appears that under these 
conditions, government repression backfired, resulting in protests spreading 
geographically and across both, wealthy and impoverished groups (Boudreau 2000, 
p.37). Thus, economic stagnation may in some cases help facilitate nonviolent 
campaigns in diverse autocracies.     
Studies also suggest that nonviolent protests appear to play an important role in 
bringing about transitions to democratic rule in autocratic states (e.g., Sharp 2003; 
Teorell 2010).  Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) find that the presence of nonviolent 
campaigns increases the likelihood of transition to democratic regimes, while the 





autocratic rule.  Ethnicity appears to play a negative role in this transition process.  
Merkel and Weiffen (2012) demonstrate the adverse effects of ethnicity on democratic 
transition and consolidation, as countries with the highest ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (ELF) scores are more likely to end up in the category of failed 
democratizes.  As the example of Syria suggests, small ethnic groups that feel 
threatened during the transition process may choose to side with the incumbent 
government simply out of fear that the new government will continue similar 
repressive policies and that their minority status may not significantly change once 
the other, larger ethnic group takes over.   Thus, given that opposing regime injustices 
encompasses a complex set of cooperation and coalition building dynamics, ethnic 
diversity should be taken into account when studying nonviolent collective action.  
Ethnic identity plays a significant role in mobilization of people and resources and the 
following section we explore the conditions under which ethnic identity presents a 
barrier for collective action in non-democracies.   
 
2.3 Nonviolent Campaigns: Incentives and Barriers in Non-
Democracies 
 
Injustices, opportunities and effective mobilization networks are needed for the 
initiation of both, violent and nonviolent uprisings (Geddes 1999; Goldstone 2009; 
Nepstad 2011; Butcher and Svensson 2014).  Underlying grievances can be similar in 
both, violent and nonviolent campaigns, however, the factors that facilitate each 
campaign onset and continuation differ.  While the initiation and the effectiveness of 
nonviolent campaigns depends on mass mobilization, loyalty shifts and direct 





military capacity and skill, territorial control and the direct degradation of 
government capacity (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015, p.3; Chenoweth and Stephan 
2011).  The level of participation is much higher in nonviolent campaigns, both in 
terms of the number of active participants and the geographic scope.  Given that 
nonviolent campaigns rely on people power, cooperation across various groups is an 
important prerequisite for a broad-based nonviolent resistance campaign.  In contrast, 
cooperation across various ethnic groups is often not needed for the emergence of 
violent campaign against a regime.  Violent and nonviolent campaigns differ in terms 
of conditions that facilitate each campaign, the goals and participation levels, and so 
this paper focuses primarily on the onset of nonviolent campaigns.   
The barriers to nonviolent mobilization are numerous; ranging from government 
repression to a lack of organizational and resource capacity to initiate uprisings.  
Coordination and cooperation challenges exist in ethnically homogenous as well as 
ethnically heterogeneous societies.  However, these types of issues may become even 
more difficult to resolve in ethnically heterogeneous states due to lower levels of trust 
and participation in ethnically diverse societies (Putnam 2007; Alesina and LaFerrara 
2000). Opp (2009) suggests that the cost-benefit calculation to join nonviolent 
campaign is different when one identifies with a group, as loyalty and interest in 
group goals may provide additional motivation to join mass mobilization (p.226).  
Thus, individuals may be more likely to embrace collective action in cases where 
personal and group interests overlap and where ethnic divides are less present.   
While an individual affiliation with an ethnic group is often determined by birth, 
the extent to which individuals identify with a particular group can be influenced by 
socio-political conditions in a country (Smith et al 2014; Thomas and Louis 2013; 





culture (Benski et al. 2013, p.552).  In some societies, ethnicity, race, language or 
class boundaries may present a barrier for collective action, in others, these 
boundaries are less important.  Ethnic ties and allegiances may be re-negotiated and 
altered in cases where people are free to join and establish formal and informal socio-
political networks that go beyond ethnic boundaries. This is largely possible in 
democracies where power is shared and people enjoy freedoms of association and 
assembly. On the contrary, limits to social participation in non-democracies may 
negatively affect inclusion and integration of diverse populations and deepen ethnic 
divides.  Thus, given that democracies promote greater inclusion and people are able 
to use official channels to take a political action (Schock, 2003, p.705), the focus of 
this chapter is on the emergence of nonviolent campaigns in non-democracies. 
Syria provides a good example of the potential challenges that nonviolent 
movements face when engaging in efforts to topple authoritarian governments in 
ethnically diverse states.  Since Hafaz Al-Assad decisively seized power in 1970, 
political power in Syria has been strictly organized along ethnic lines with the 
Alawites exercising control over the military, intelligence and security apparatuses, 
despite the group constituting less than 11% of the total Syrian population (Nepstad 
2013; Polk 2013). Although Syria had been relatively politically stable until 2011, 
nonviolent protests in key cities such as Damascus and Aleppo have initially led to a 
wider scale, non-sectarian unrests, bringing together participants from different ethnic 
and religious communities (Bartkowski and Kahf 2013; Sinjab 2011). In turn, 
massive government repression and the perceived vulnerability of the Syrian 
government have motivated a number of Syrian Army soldiers to defect and form the 
so-called Free Syrian Army with an aim to seize the control of the Syrian government 





consequences of this turn was an increase in sectarianism since the Free Syrian Army 
was perceived to be Sunni dominated (Nepstad 2013).  Following this development, 
the government has used fear to influence the views of minority groups, asserting that 
their safety will be compromised in case the opposition wins, dividing the protesters 
along sectarian and ethnic lines (Matthiesen 2013, p.120; Berti and Paris 2014, p.24).  
As Syrian opposition became fractionalized, violent conflict escalated, eventually 
leading to the rise of the Islamic State as a key actor.  In short, efforts to develop 
nonviolent campaigns in ethnically diverse, autocratic states may be thwarted by 
ethnic divides.   
Anocracy, another type of non-democratic regime, is primarily studied in relation 
to civil wars.  While some studies find that these types of regimes are more prone to 
civil wars (see Herge et al. 2001), others suggest the opposite (Vreeland 2008; 
Cunningham et al. 2017).  The literature on nonviolent campaigns rarely distinguishes 
between the two types of non-democratic regimes, as both, autocracies and anocracies 
employ strategies that deter protest activities.  Recent study by Cunningham et al. 
(2017) is an exception, showing that anocracies are more likely to experience claim 
making activities, but not more likely than autocracies to experience the onset of 
large-scale nonviolent campaigns as coded in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset (1000 or more 
people engaged in a sustained anti-regime campaign for more than a year), the event 
type which is the focus of this chapter.   Thus, given the findings by Cunningham et 
al. (2017) which show that non-democracies are more likely to experience nonviolent 
campaigns when compared to democracies and that anocracies are not more likely 
than autocracies to experience the onset of large-scale nonviolent campaigns, this 





Engaging in a contentious interaction with a more powerful state apparatus poses 
a certain level of risk regardless of the type of the regime that‘s being challenged.  
Nonetheless, activists are more likely to incur greater costs when opposing non-
democratic regimes (Schock 2003).  For instance, Egypt‘s Court decision to sentence 
230 activists to life imprisonment for their actions during the 2011 uprising against 
the former President Hosni Mubarak, illustrates the severity of the risk that protesters 
can face (BBC 2015). Given the risks and ideological divergences in Egyptian 
society, how did millions of people come together in 2011 to oppose Egypt‘s 
authoritarian government?  Did overarching Egyptian identity to some extent 
facilitate the emergence of nonviolent collective action in the country that has been 
controlled by the powerful military and autocratic leadership for several decades?  
Ethnic ties could provide a level of organizational capacity needed for nonviolent 
mass mobilization.  Relying on nonviolent methods to purse maximalist goals such as 
regime change requires considerable unity in opinions and strategies as well as large 
numbers of highly motivated participants (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).   
Non-democratic regimes often rely on repressive tactics to deter collective action 
by limiting the opportunities for people to openly meet and evaluate whether others 
share their grievances and goals, which makes it difficult for potential participants to 
determine the level of public‘s dissatisfaction with the regime (McGarty et al. 2014, 
p.728).  Interestingly, some governments are concerned with the public‘s outpouring 
of criticism as much as with their support.  For instance, Chinese government is 
imposing severe limits to association by censoring any social media discussions that 
have a collective action potential regardless if people are expressing complaints or 
compliments towards the regime (King et al. 2014; Little 2015).  The restrictions that 





preventing individuals from forming a common understanding of grievances and 
goals.  These types of conditions may also limit potentials for developing an over-
arching supranational identity, which enables people to identify with others beyond 
ethnic boundaries.   Being able to take into consideration needs and grievances of 
others and identify with nonviolent campaign goals beyond the bounds of ethnicity 
can lead to an increase in the numbers of participants as well as the commitment to 
withstand repressive government actions.  Thus, autocratic structures can be viewed 
in terms of both, grievances and barriers to nonviolent mobilization.   
Some studies suggest that highly repressive autocracies may make any type of 
anti-regime campaign less likely (Hegre et al, 2001).  On the contrary, Davenport 
(2004) argues that even though autocratic regimes exert greater control over their 
population and limit participation, nonviolent resistance is common in autocracies 
due to inherent problems in these types of states.  Despite the limitations that 
autocratic regimes impose on political action and organization, nonviolent anti-
government campaigns occur more often than in democracies as grievances are 
plentiful in autocracies.  However, given that protests in autocracies tend to occur 
outside of the institutionalized bounds and involve a substantial amount of risk, many 
autocracies enjoy long periods of stability, without significant instances of mass 
mobilization.  Nonviolent campaigns that emerge in autocracies must be able to 
overcome numerous barriers imposed by the restrictive and repressive autocratic 
regimes. Nonetheless, collective action is still possible and it is to be expected to 
succeed when people mobilize in large numbers. 
The challenge to mobilize a large number of committed individuals is present in 
comparatively less repressive regimes such as anocracies. Initiating a sustained, 





and commitment by a large group of individuals who may struggle to overcome 
opposing interests and aims.  Even though people in anocratic states such as former 
Yugoslavia have enjoyed certain freedoms of association and participation and were 
able to develop an overarching Yugoslav identity, ethnic tensions have prevented 
Yugoslavs from jointly confronting the Communist regime.  The protest movements 
that emerged during the 1970s-1990s period were primarily of separatist and ethnic 
character.  Despite the presence of economic and political grievances, the Yugoslav 
Communist Party held onto the power for more than four decades.  The resistance 
movements that occasionally emerged, were marred by ethnic divides and grievances 
(Cox 2004).  Both, autocratic and anocratic states are equally able and do exploit 
ethnic grievances to demobilise masses.  Thus, this chapter does not distinguish 
between the two types of non-democratic regimes.  Mass mobilization is a primary 
component of any nonviolent civil resistance campaign and a certain degree of 
consensus among participants is vital for the campaign initiation and desired 
outcome.  Participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns tends to be larger in 
comparison to violent campaigns as people face less barriers in terms of physical 
strength, commitment, information, and moral dilemmas (Chenoweth and Stephan 
2011).  Given the differences in the mobilization paths and the large body of literature 
on ethnicity and violent conflict, the current paper focuses on examining how and if 
ethnicity affects people‘s willingness to join a nonviolent campaign.  Thus, instead of 
focusing on tactical choices and shifts between violent and nonviolent tactics, we test 







2.4 Propositions  
 
Nonviolent campaigns have the potential to create major shifts in political life, either 
by ushering regime change or by reforming a regime through a policy change 
(Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015).  A realization that ordinary people can successfully 
challenge repressive, corrupt, and ineffective governments and that mass mobilization 
is the primary resource needed to achieve social change, has sparked a discussion 
about the disciplined nonviolent resistance and ways to initiate cohesive and 
successful anti-government campaigns (Schock 2005; Ackerman and Karatnycky 
2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).  Mass nonviolent campaigns face numerous 
obstacles in terms of human, financial and informational capabilities, and one thing 
that seems very important for both, nonviolent campaign initiation and successful 
political transition, is a strong, broad-based, cohesive civic coalition that uses 
nonviolent methods to achieve its goals.   
Ethnic divisions and tensions have a potential to fracture broad-based civic 
opposition and could help explain why we see the onset of nonviolent campaigns in 
some non-democracies and not in others, given the motivation and the availability of 
the resources.  Common ethnic identity instils a sense of common purpose, facilitates 
articulation of goals and grievances, and positively affects coordination.  In other 
words, common ethnic identity helps shape a ―shared reality‖ upon which people base 
their actions (Hardin and Higgins, 1996; Thomas and Louis, 2013; see Stern, et al., 
2014 for discussion).  In order to recognize that injustices require united action, a 
group of people need to be able to either rely on solidarity on the basis of ethnic ties 
or the links and interests that go beyond ethnic categories to bring together diverse 





For instance, even though pro-democracy campaigns in Serbia and Syria have 
faced equally unyielding and repressive state apparatuses, with leaders Slobodan 
Milošević and Bashar al-Assad firmly entrenched in their positions of power, the 
primary method of resistance differed.  While in the more ethnically homogenous 
Serbia, pro-democracy movement Otpor (2000) was able to sustain a nonviolent 
campaign, a nonviolent resistance in more ethnically heterogeneous Syria (2011) was 
quickly overshadowed by violent uprising and ethnic divisions (Nepstad 2013; 
Bartkowski and Khaf 2013; Polk 2013).  In comparison to Serbia, the opposition in 
Syria was faced with numerous challenges while seeking to establish cooperation 
across various ethnic groups.  Sectarian cleavages in Syria have made it more difficult 
to form a unified, nonviolent campaign. Given the divisive effects of ethnicity, we 
propose to test the following hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 1: The onset of nonviolent campaigns is less likely in ethnically 
diverse states. 
 
Ethnicity plays an important role in some social contexts, and less so in others. 
Levels of societal interaction and participation determines to what extent people are 
able to develop collective identity that transcends ethnic and other societal 
boundaries.  For instance, in democracies, where individuals are able to freely 
communicate and exchange information, develop and embrace social norms and 
identities beyond their ethnic categories, ethnicity is likely to have less of a negative 
effect on collective action (Smith et al. 2014). On the contrary, limits to freedom of 





become less likely to interact with those outside of their ethnic group, which in turns 
leads to further mistrust and misunderstandings (McGarty et al., 2014).   
In non-democratic states where the provision of public goods and access to 
state power is organized along ethnic lines, politicized ethnic identities may become a 
barrier for nonviolent campaign initiation. Status and power influence the types of 
relations in a society, leading to inclusion, exclusion, monopoly or partnership among 
others (Cederman et al. 2010). The types of social networks that get to be formed in 
more exclusionary in comparison to inclusionary societies will affect the types of the 
campaigns we observe (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Klandermans and Staggenborg 
2002). Non-democratic societies are characterized by higher levels of political 
exclusion, economic inequality as well as higher levels of violent conflict occurrence 
(Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013).  In the cases where exclusion happens 
along ethnic lines, anger and resentment can further divide people and fuel violent 
clashes (Petersen 2002).    
Limits to freedom of expression and association exacerbate ethnic divides in non-
democracies.   Those living under restrictive and oppressive regimes may not be able 
to easily determine to what extent their grievances are shared by others, gauge the 
level of the support for the cause, validate their views because of limited social 
interaction and a lack of information, know enough about the ethnic others to trust 
them, or interact and relate to others beyond ethnic boundaries.  Under these 
conditions ethnic differences can be exploited, to prevent cooperation and 
coordination and diminish the likelihood of nonviolent mass mobilization in 
ethnically diverse non-democracies.  
Hypothesis 2: The onset of nonviolent campaigns is more likely in ethnically 







2.5 Data and Model Specifications 
 
We use a logistic regression model to estimate the likelihood of nonviolent campaign 
onset for all independent states during 1946-2006, with country-year as the unit of 
analysis.  Given that ethnic diversity (ED) scores do not greatly vary within a country 
across time, the estimates in Table 2.2 present robust standard errors clustered by 
country.  We also take into account temporal dependence and present the results 
including cubic polynomials of the time since last nonviolent campaign in the 
Appendix 6.3 (Carter and Signorino 2010). The results do not change in any 
significant way with the inclusion of time since last event.  
 
2.5.1 The Dependent Variable 
 
Our dependent variable, nonviolent campaign onset, is extracted from NAVCO 2.0 
dataset.  This dataset considers nonviolent campaigns to be events with a minimum of 
1000 participants, with purposive and sustained nonviolent action against a 
government that lasts for a year or longer (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013).  We code 
nonviolent campaign onset as a binary indicator where one indicates the years in 
which nonviolent campaign starts, and zero otherwise. According to this dataset, there 
are in total 109 nonviolent campaign onsets for the period under study.  In this paper, 
we analyse nonviolent campaigns (NVC) that either seek to remove or reform an 
existing regime. Given our intrinsic interest in nonviolent campaigns against the 
central government, we only analyse 87 instances of onset where demands are 





policy change.  Consequently, we exclude all nonviolent campaign onsets that relate 
to territorial secession, greater autonomy and anti-occupation from the analyses.
3
 
Before estimating the models, all observations that had missing values on any 
of the models‘ variables were deleted, and so the number of nonviolent campaign 
onsets is reduced from 87 to 72 as Figure 2.1 shows. Figure 2.1 also shows that 
nonviolent campaign activity peaks around the 1980s-1990s period. The analysis only 
includes data after 1960 since most of the early nonviolent campaigns were calls for 
independence (ex. Nigerian Independence Movement against British occupation, 
1947). Also in some cases population and GDP data were missing for that period (ex. 
South Africa First Defiance Campaign, 1952).  Finally, it is relevant to mention that 
in our sample there are no country-years where both violent and nonviolent 
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 NAVCO 2.0 identifies a total of 109 nonviolent campaign onsets. Out of those, 87 (79,82%) 
nonviolent campaign onsets are related to incompatibilities with the central government while only 22 











2.5.2 Explanatory Variables 
 
Our main independent variables are ethnic diversity and non-democracy.  Diversity is 
mainly observed in terms of fragmented distribution of the population over a set of 
demographic characteristics such as ethnicity, language or culture (Esteban and 
Schneider, 2008).  The ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index is usually 
calculated using a Herfindahl concentration index based on the data collected by 
Soviet ethnographers in the early 1960s and published in the Atlas Narodov Mira 
(Taylor and Hudson 1972; Posner 2004).  The distribution and power-relations 
between ethnic groups has changed in the last 50 years with some groups becoming 
more relevant than others, expanding and shrinking in size, emerging and 





diversity (ED) scores are calculated using the EPR 2014 version dataset which 
provides up to date information on group size and their political status (Vogt et al. 
2015).   
The ED index is calculated with information from the EPR dataset.  The EPR 
data on ethnic group relations captures the relevance and the salience of ethnic 
categories.  We use information on the political relevance that ethnic groups have in a 
country to calculate salience of ethnic categories; so that ED variable ranges from 
zero (ethnicity is not salient) to one (ethnicity highly salient).  Similar to the ELF, ED 
measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from the overall 
population belong to different ethnic groups. However, we refer to our measure as ED 
instead of ELF since ELF reflects demographic distribution of ethnic groups, and ED 
takes into account salience of ethnic categories.  
We use Polity2 scale to distinguish non-democracies from democracies 
(Marshall, Keith, and Robert 2016).  Polity2 is a measure of institutional 
democracy/autocracy, with score of 10 indicating the most democratic and -10 the 
most autocratic state.  Following the convention in the literature, the Polity2 score is 
used to create a dummy variable, with non-democracies being all the countries that 
receive 5 or less on the Polity2 score.  In Figure 2.2 we show the distribution of ED 
for non-democratic and democratic states in our sample. In here we see that non-
democracies are prone to be more ethnically diverse than democracies.      
In addition to these baseline variables, we also test for an interaction between 
ethnicity and regime type to test the effects of ethnicity on nonviolent campaign 







Figure 2.2 Boxplot: Ethnic Diversity and Regime Type  
 
 
2.5.3 Control Variables 
 
We control for several factors that can affect the likelihood of nonviolent campaign 
onset.  First, we control for the share of excluded population variable in a given 
country given that exclusion may make violent campaigns more likely.  This 
information is drawn from the EPR dataset and it reflects the size of groups that lack 
representation in the executive or cannot exert any political influence and are actively 
discriminated against.  While groups with no influence and groups that are targeted 
by the government might have plenty of motivation to revolt against the central 
authority, they might not necessarily be able to develop links and the organizational 
capacities needed for mass nonviolent mobilization, so in turn, they might resort to 
violence.  The risk of separatist challenges and civil wars is particularly high when 





the risk being substantially higher in ethnocracies where smaller privileged ethnic 
groups exclude larger majorities (Buhaug et al. 2014; Wimmer et al. 2009).   
Second, we control for the economic status of the country using the expanded 
data on GDP per capita from Gleditsch (2002).  The nonviolent mobilization 
literature has shown that GDP per capita is expected to be positively associated with 
nonviolent campaign onset.  Wealthy autocracies are expected to have an advanced 
level of an organizational infrastructure that can facilitate nonviolent resistance 
(Butcher and Svensson 2014).  In addition, some studies have found negative effects 
of ethnic diversity on economic performance, so we expect that negative effects of 
ethnic diversity on overall economic performance will also have an indirect effect on 
socioeconomic resources that facilitate collective action (Alesina et al. 2003; Alesina 
and LaFerrara 2005; Merkel and Weiffen 2012). 
Finally, we also control for the size of the urban population in a country 
(Gleditsch 2002, expanded data). The size of the urban population is often found to 
have a positive effect on the onset of nonviolent campaigns (Dahl et al., 2014; 
Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015).  Urbanization may also increase ethnic diversity in 
certain regions which could ameliorate negative effects of ethnic divisions. Both 
variables, GDP per capita and population are logged due to severe nonlinearity. 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 
 
 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min   Max    Sum 
 Ethnic Diversity (ED) 6,203 0.38 0.27 0.00   0.89    2339.09 
Autocracy 6,203 0.59 0.49 0     1       3681 
Nonviolent campaign 6,203 0.01 0.11 0     1           72 
Urban population log 6,203 8.10 1.70 3.00  13.00    50338.64 
GDP per capita log 6,203 7.50 1.40 4.40  12.00    46674.14 
 
 





      
2.6 Results  
 
Table 2.2 presents six models that estimate the effects of ethnic diversity (ED), 
excluded population, regime type urban population size and GDP per capita on the 
onset of nonviolent campaigns.  The models are estimated separately to be able to 
assess independent effects of each variable on the onset of nonviolent campaigns. 
 Model 1 shows that, contrary to the expectation, ED does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the onset of nonviolent campaigns.  The results do 
not provide support for Hypothesis 1.  Additionally, the results regarding the ED 
effects on nonviolent campaign onset do not change with introduction of excluded 
population variable in Model 2 and urban population and GDP per capita in the 
Model 3 (the sign of the effect changes, but it‘s still non-significant).   Interestingly, 
the ED effects changes to positive and significant in Model 5.  The effect of non-
democracy is positive and consistently significant across Models 4-6. 
 Model 5 results indicate that the presence of two factors, non-democracy 
and high levels of ethnic diversity (ED), reduces the likelihood of the nonviolent 
campaign onset.  The significant and negative interaction between these two variables 
at the 5% level provides further the support for Hypothesis 2.  The positive 
coefficient for ED in Model 5 indicates that in some cases ethnicity may facilitate 
nonviolent resistance, but that its potential is greatly reduced in ethnically diverse 
non-democratic states.   In order to interpret logit model interaction term coefficient 
and determine the direction of the relationship, we plot marginal effects (conditional 
coefficients) for this interaction term using interplot R package.  Figure 2.3 shows 
that with increasing ED, the magnitude of the coefficient of non-democracy on the 





Table 2.2 Onset of Nonviolent Campaigns (NVC) /Country Year 
                                                Dependent variable: NVC onset (0/1) 
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(0.083) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) 
 ED *  Non-






     
(1.330) (1.334) 
       Constant -4.459*** -4.439*** -6.176*** -8.747*** -9.653*** -9.543*** 
 
(0.249) (0.249) (0.718) (0.965) (1.028) (1.016) 
       
Observations 6,203 6,203 6,203 6,203 6,203 6,203 
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The marginal effect of non-democracy is positive and significant for the range of ED 
values under 0.63 and negative and significant above this level of ED, indicating that 
likelihood of nonviolent campaign onset may be low in ethnically diverse non-
democracies, with 95% confidence intervals.   The opposite is true for democratic 
states, where the likelihood of the NVC onset increases with an increase in ED levels.  
One possible interpretation is that ethnic diversity represents less of a barrier for 
nonviolent campaign initiation in democratic in comparison to non-democratic states.  





ethnically diverse in comparison to ethnically homogenous democracies.   Alesina 
and LaFerrara (2005) find that ethnic diversity has a negative effect on economic 
performance, which in turn can affect grievance levels. Thus, it is possible that more 
ethnically homogenous democracies experience less economic grievances and have a 
lower likelihood of mass-scale nonviolent campaign emergence.   
 
Figure 2.3 Marginal effect of Non-democracy and Democracy on the onset of 
nonviolent campaigns (NVC) across Ethnic Diversity (ED) values 
 
           
 The effect of GDP per capita changes from negative and significant in 
Model 3 to positive and non-significant across Models 4-6.  Monetary resources may 
play more of an important role for the campaign continuation and have a more 
significant effect in the years following the onset, while all is needed for nonviolent 
campaign initiation is a mass support and participation from the unarmed and highly 
motivated population. Another possible explanation for this finding is that wealthy 
non-democracies are more likely to use the funds to control and suppress nonviolent 





significant predictor of nonviolent campaign onsets, and the result is robust across 
model specifications.   
 
2.7 Model Validation: Simulated Predicted Probabilities  
 
Simulated predicted probabilities is a good test of model‘s predictive power as it 
relies on data estimations from the current model to predict events in the future that 
have not yet occurred (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015, p.16).  Figure 2.4 illustrates 
that the simulated predicted probability of the nonviolent campaign onset in 
ethnically homogenous and non-democratic states is over 2% with the probability of 
nonviolent campaigns onset decreasing to less than 0.7% as ethnic diversity increases. 
While the trend indicates a lower likelihood of the onset of nonviolent campaigns in 
ethnically diverse non-democracies, the 95% confidence interval is wide.  The issue 
might be related to modelling uncertainties for rare events (Beck and Zuev 2017). 
Interestingly, the findings in Figure 2.4 show that the observed trend in democracies 
is opposite to the trend observed for non-democracies in relation the likelihood of the 
onset of nonviolent campaigns.  Given the small number of cases of ethnically diverse 
democracies where we observe the onset of the NVC, the results should be interpreted 
with caution.  However, the existence of the opposite trend in relation to the regime 
type, illustrates that ethnicity is more of a barrier in non-democratic when compared 
to democratic states when it comes to initiating nonviolent anti-regime campaigns.  
Another possible explanation for the results in Figure 2.4 is that the aggregate Polity 
2 index may not provide the most sensitive measure of regime characteristics in 
relation to the nonviolent campaigns emergence.  States employ various tactics to 





protest laws to verbally discrediting protesters‘ demands.  Thus, an aggregate 
measure of regime type might not capture subtle differences in state‘s tactical 
responses to protest events.  Our results indicate that the onset of nonviolent 
campaigns in ethnically diverse non-democracies (ED > 0.63) still occurred in 13% of 
the country-years as Appendix 6.1 illustrates.  In Bolivia for instance, the 1977 
nonviolent campaign emerged despite high levels of autocracy (-7 on Polity2 scale) 
and high levels of salient ethnic diversity (0.67).  Bolivia did experience several 
military coups leading up to the onset of nonviolent campaign in 1977; however, 
according to Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015), coups as a proxy measure of elite 
instability is not a good predictor of nonviolent campaign onset. The civil liberties 
index, as a part of the political opportunity model, appears to be the most powerful 
predictor of nonviolent campaign onset in their study.   Thus, we use civil liberties 
index as coded in Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) as a robustness check for 
hypotheses.  According to the Freedom House aggregate data, the civil liberties score 
for Bolivia during this period ranged from 3-5 (moderately protect almost all civil 













Figure 2.4 Simulated predicted probabilities (y axis) of the onset of nonviolent 
campaigns (NVC) in ethnically diverse (x=1) in comparison to ethnically 
homogenous states (x=0), conditional on regime type, across average values of other 
variables with 95 % simulated confidence intervals. 
 
 
2.8 Robustness Checks   
 
Freedom House annual global reports on political rights and civil liberties account for 
the rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals in independent states across the globe 
(Freedom House, 2015). The sub-categories for assessing civil liberties include 
questions regarding the freedom of peaceful assembly and demonstration, the legal 
frameworks to engage in protest actions, freedom of association and membership in 





trade unions and other free professional and private organizations. A civil liberties 
score is entered as a factor variable with 7 intervals, scores ranging from one (wide 
range of civil liberties) to seven (few or no civil liberties).  Results indicate that civil 
liberties scores between three and seven have a positive and significant effect on 
nonviolent campaign onset, with a score of 4 being the most consistent predictor (See 
Appendix 6.2).  The inclusion of civil liberties scores slightly changes the 
significance and the size of the interaction effect ED* non-democracy, however, this 
should be taken with caution as the missing values on the civil liberty data drops the 
number of campaign onsets from 72 to 63.  Thus, the slightly weaker effect of 
ethnicity and non-democracy in this model may be due to reduction in data points.   
 
2.9 Discussion  
 
Endogeneity related issues are often discussed in nonviolent resistance literature 
(Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015).  The reverse causality between regime type and 
nonviolent campaign onset in this chapter is taken into account by including a more 
sensitive measure of a regime‘s direct impact on people‘s willingness and 
opportunities to engage in protest activities – Freedom House civil liberties index.  
The results in Appendix 6.2 do not significantly change for any of the estimates with 
the inclusion of civil liberties score.    Endogeneity effects are not existent in relation 
to the ethnic diversity variable – nonviolent campaigns will not affect levels of ethnic 
diversity. 
The findings in this study indicate that ethnicity is related to other political 
processes besides violent conflict emergence.  For instance, the recent study by 





mediation processes – closer cultural ties between a mediator and belligerents make 
mediation more likely. They conclude that common ties make coordination less 
costly.  I draw similar conclusions in the section below in regards to the coordination 
and cooperation needed to initiate nonviolent mass campaigns.   
 
2.10 Conclusion  
 
In this paper we show that ethnicity presents a barrier for nonviolent mass 
mobilization in ethnically diverse non-democracies.  The results indicate that solving 
collective action problems may be easier in ethnically homogenous in comparison to 
ethnically heterogeneous non-democracies.  Non-democratic regimes often exploit 
and politicise ethnic divides to eliminate the threat that nonviolent campaigns pose for 
their survival.  Politicized ethnic groups are more likely to display high levels of in-
group favouritism, intergroup biases and opposing interests, all of which impede 
nonviolent collective action initiation.  We conclude that the existence of sectarian 
cleavages in ethnically heterogeneous non-democratic states presents a barrier for 
nonviolent mass mobilization and predisposes societies for the emergence of violent 
conflict.     
Ethnic diversity acts as a barrier for nonviolent collective action only when 
high levels of ethnic diversity coincide with the presence of non-democratic rule.  
While this finding to some extent explains why nonviolent campaigns emerge in 
some non-democratic states and not others, more work needs to be done to understand 
nonviolent campaign trends.   In particular, there seems to be a lack of focus on how 
states and societies plan to address complex diversity of aims, values and goals once 





successfully challenge non-democratic regimes via nonviolent tactics requires a 
genuine investment in developing democratic relations and civil society structures 
among opposition groups that can help improve social cohesion among politically and 
socially divided groups during and after anti-government campaign.   
The findings from this paper open the opportunity for further research on 
nonviolent political contestation.  In our future research we will aim to identify ways 
in which demographically and culturally diverse actors, with potentially diverse sets 
of interests overcome identity and interest based barriers to engage in nonviolent 
collective action.   In addition, we will also aim to examine uprisings beyond violent-
nonviolent dichotomy and focus on varieties of civil resistance strategies that range 


















Framing and Undermining Dissent: The Case of 


























Activists and governments engage in strategic framing of social unrests and utilize 
news media to influence public. ‗Framing‘ in this chapter is defined as creating a set 
of ideas and narratives that help us and others interpret and relate to the events around 
us.  Given that governments have a considerable advantage in spreading information, 
frames articulated by political leaders could have a greater influence on how people 
make sense of ambiguous situations such as social unrests. Nonetheless, scholars 
mainly focus on the frames articulated by protest activists.  I utilize automated text 
analysis, structural topic modelling methods, to investigate the framing of the 2014 
spring protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina‘s (B&H) two semi-autonomous entities 
(areas); the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FB&H) where protests emerged 
on a much larger scale in comparison to the Republic of Srpska (RS) entity.  The 
findings indicate that the FB&H political leaders have used both sympathizing and 
delegitimizing frames, while the RS government mainly framed the protests as a 
threat to the RS autonomy.  The RS government‘s strategy to bypass grievances and 
evoke more salient issue such as the RS autonomy may help explain low levels of 















Provocateurs, hooligans and traitors are just some of the words that authorities often 
use to describe protest participants.  Hence, it was somewhat surprising when Željko 
Komšić, the Chairperson of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), 
choose to side with the protesters during the 2014 spring protests in B&H.   Similarly, 
Živko Budimir, the President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FB&H), 
one of the two semi-autonomous B&H entities (areas)
4
 also expressed his support, 
saying that the unrest was justified since the B&H politicians have long ignored the 
interests of ordinary people (Oslobodjenje 2014.a).  This type of support is puzzling 
given that governments primarily tend to respond to protests either by ignoring or 
repressing dissent, and less often conceding to protesters‘ demands (Bishara 2016; 
Carey 2006; Franklin 2009).   
While several high ranking politicians at the B&H national and FB&H entity 
level have acknowledged that the protests were inevitable and genuine, the officials 
from the second B&H entity, the Republic of Srpska (RS), were less supportive, 
referring to the protests as a Bosniak-Croat and a foreign plot against the RS 
(Oslobodjenje 2014.b).  Since the end of the conflict in 1995, the RS leadership has 
                                                          
4
The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) established that Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) 
should be divided into 3 administrative units: 2 entities (FB&H and RS) and 1 Brčko Distict 
(BD) (Appendix 6.5).  The FB&H is mainly inhabited by Bosnian Bosniaks and Bosnian 
Croats, hence the Federation, while the RS is mainly inhabited by Bosnian Serbs.  The FB&H 
occupies 51% of the BH territory and the RS 49%. Brčko District is territorially ―divided‖ 
between the FB&H and the RS.  Brčko Distict is still a self-governing unit, with both, the 
laws of the District and the B&H national laws having the precedent. Brčko Distict consists 
of one city, Brčko, with a mixed ethic makeup. The Presidency of B&H, elected every 4 
years, consists of 3 members: a Croat, a Bosniak and a Serb representative. They collectively 
serve as the Head of the State, with each member rotating every 9 months to serve as the 
Chairperson of the Presidency.  Komšić, a Croat member of the Presidency served as a 
Chairperson until 10
th
 of March 2014 – the period of most intense protest activity was 
February 2014. Izetbegović, a Bosniak member, took over the position for the following 9 
months (see Bertelsmann Stiftung2014; The Guardian, May 2014; Søberg 2008).   
 





actively sought to safeguard the independence of the RS institutions guaranteed by 
the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA).  The RS politicians have also called for 
the RS self-determination on numerous occasions accusing the FB&H Government of 
attempts to undermine the interests of the RS citizens and the independence of the RS 
institution (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2015; Sisic and Sajinovic 2014).  The 2011 Gallup poll 
showed that the majority of the Bosnian Serbs think that the RS should be able to 
secede from the B&H in the future (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014).  The diverging 
interests and agendas of the RS and the FB&H politicians as well as the divisions 
between the B&H‘s three major ethnic groups have resulted in a wide range of frames 
and views regarding the reasons behind 2014 spring protests.   
This chapter aims to explore the regime‘s verbal responses to protest events.  
Based on the findings, the rhetoric (frames) by the government are categorized into 
three categories: delegitimizing (ex. calling protesters traitors), demobilizing 
(sympathetic statements), and alternative views (sidelining/ignoring grievances).  
This chapter contributes to the current protest literature by providing a potential 
framework for categorizing government frames – an area of research that has received 
very little attention in the protest literature.   
Using automated text analysis tools and methods such as structural topic 
modelling this chapter shows that the Government officials from the two B&H 
entities have framed protests differently; the RS officials primarily discrediting 
protest participants and their demands and the FB&H officials being both, supportive 
and dismissive of protests.  In this chapter I also discuss how this difference in the 
framing may help explain low levels of protest mobilization in the RS in comparison 
to the FB&H.  The methods I use are exploratory rather than confirmatory, and so the 





presented in descriptive terms.  Nonetheless, the methods used in this study still allow 
for a development of a theoretical framework within which government frames can be 
defined and examined in the future studies.  In summary, the primary goal of this 
chapter is to provide a categorisation of government frames that could help guide 
future research in linking government frames and protest mobilisation levels.   
The systematic categorisation of large sets of documents such as news reports 
on protest events has been greatly advanced by the automated text analysis tools. 
Automated text analysis methods can be used to ―assign documents into 
predetermined categories, discover new and useful categorization schemes for texts, 
or in measuring theoretically relevant quantities from large collections of text‖ 
(Grimmer and Stewart 2013, p.270).   The theoretical quantities of interest in this 
study are the discourses and topics of discussion that governments engage in when 
describing (framing) protest events.  This chapter seeks to define and classify 
governments‘ verbal responses to protest events and address a lack of systematic 
effort in the current literature to define government frames.  Thus, the methods and 
analyses in this chapter are designed to uncover the language that government 
officials use to frame uprisings. Government officials interpret and challenge 
protesters‘ claims with an aim to create a set of ideas that resonate more widely with a 
general public than the ideas put forward by protest activists  (Johnston and Noakes 
2005; Fumagalli 2007).  Even though governments engage in a strategic framing of 
protest events, the current protest literature mainly focuses on the frames expressed 
by protest participants.  This is surprising given that most governments have a 
considerable advantage in spreading information, and thus, the frames articulated by 
political leaders could potentially have a greater effect on how people view 





my knowledge, this is the first study that categorizes and describes government 
frames.   
The current literature on social movements offers important insights into 
governments‘ use of physical force to repress protest events (Gurr 1986; Earl, Soule, 
and McCarthy 2003; Carey 2006; Davenport 2007), but it overlooks the effects of 
governments‘ rhetoric and the language used to intimidate, discredit and undermine 
protest movements.  This chapter shows how governments use language to construct 
and advance narratives that fit their own political agendas as well as to minimize 
challenges to their rule.  Better understanding of the ways in which governments 
frame protest situations will improve our comprehension of protest dynamics in 
general.          
Scholars rely on newspaper reports to identify who, when, how and where 
protests have emerged.  Even though newspaper and social media reports are filled 
with sentiments, due to methodological and theoretical limitations, protest event 
analysis is often reduced to the study of protest location, size and actors involved.  
However, in order to better understand the links between place, time and protest 
intensity, more insight is needed into the frames and vocabularies behind the mass 
mobilization (Desrosiers 2012).   
Recent advancements in quantitative text analysis provide useful tools that can 
extend the scope of the social movement research.  Automated data processing and 
analysis techniques provide unlimited possibilities for a systematic evaluation of 
large volumes of political texts (Grimmer and Stewart 2013).  While hand-coding of 
texts requires from researches to pre-define and identify meaningful categories in 
selected texts, algorithmic procedures rely on minimum human intervention to detect 





2013; Krippendorf 2012).  Automated coding of latent variables such as protest 
frames may be more efficient and reliable given that it‘s based on a data-driven, strict 
coding rules that can be applied to a large number of texts (Lowe and Benoit 2013; 
DiMaggio et al. 2013).  This chapter utilizes automated data coding and analysis 
procedures to systematically evaluate frames that emerged during the 2014 B&H 
protests.      
Protest studies primarily examine grievances, resources, political opportunity 
structures, and tactical choices that activists employ to resist a regime.  Some studies 
also seek to identify preferences, ideologies and frames that help mobilize and/or 
demobilize communities (see Johnston and Noakes 2005; Fumagalli 2007; Desrosiers 
2012).  Those that study framing processes primarily focus on the types of frames 
proposed by protest activists and largely disregard government frames.  This chapter 
extends the current literature by providing theoretical and empirical support for a 
framework that also involves government frames.  The paragraphs below provide a 
brief overview of the current literature on framing processes from the social 
movement perspective.  
 
3.2 Framing Processes:  Protest Movement and Government 
Perspective  
 
Frames can be described as a ―schemata of interpretation‖ (Goffman 1974) that 
simplify our world, guide our actions and help us organize our lives by providing a 
meaning to events around us (Snow et al. 1986, p.464; Opp 2009, p.235).  In short, 
frames are strategic, simple and meaningful ideas developed and deployed to achieve 





Frames are particularly relevant in uncertain and risky situations such as social 
protests, as they guide our interpretation of events and experiences.   Persuasive and 
resonant frames may be enough to mobilize people even when organisational and 
resource structures are weak or absent (Walgrave and Manssens 2005, p.114).  Thus, 
frames play an important role in political action, linking people‘s goals and beliefs 
into a relatable, consistent and a resonant message that can mobilize masses.      
In times of social unrest, people are often caught in a recruitment battle 
between a government and a protest movement.  Social movement frames that 
encompass strategic framing of injustices and goals are often competing with various 
demobilizing ideas posed by governments whose aim is to effectively counter 
protesters‘ claims.  For instance, the current President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, then Prime Minister, had actively engaged in negative and delegitimizing 
framing of 2013 Gezi Park protests, suggesting that protests were instigated by an 
international interest rate lobby, the foreign media, and even the airline Lufthansa 
(Reynolds 2013).  This type of response can be viewed as a form of verbal repression 
as the government is questioning the legitimacy of the movement‘s claims and 
undercutting the movement‘s efforts to address existing grievances in Turkey.  The 
Turkish government engaged in verbal and physical repression, successfully 
suppressing the movement and combating an increase in negative sentiments towards 
then Prime Minister Erdoğan.  While the Gezi Park movement generated large and 
wide-spread protests across the country (Reynolds 2013), the movement did not 
produce a lasting policy change (BBC 2016) or a well-organized campaign capable of 
confronting increasing authoritarian tendencies of the Turkish Government.  This 
outcome could to some extent be explained by the government‘s choice to verbally 





importance of understanding framing processes from both, regimes‘ and a social 
movements‘ perspective, saying that ―understanding of official (state) frames is 
central to understanding the context in which social movements rise, prosper and 
decline‖ (Noakes 2005, p.101).  Thus, examining ways in which governments frame 
grievances in a public space can yield valuable insights into government responses 
and mobilization processes.   
In the current literature, the regimes‘ framing of protest events is primarily 
understood in the terms of the counter-frames.  A handful of studies that discuss 
government framing of protest events suggest that these frames are largely a counter-
reaction to protesters‘ frames (Desrosiers 2012; Noakes 2005; Benford and Snow 
2000, p.617).  This view neglects a possibility that a regime might engage in an active 
and strategic framing of socio-political conditions in the period before and after 
protests emerge, and not only as a reaction to protesters frames.  In order to develop a 
framework to study government frames, I rely on the theoretical arguments and 
insights that the current literature offers in relation to the frames articulated by social 
movement participants and leaders. The social movement literature categorizes social 
movement framing processes into three categories: diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational/mobilization types of frames (see Opp 2009 for a detailed theoretical 
discussion).  Diagnostic framing identifies the sources and the victims of the 
injustices, prognostic framing involves planning on what should be done and what are 
the consequences, and motivational framing provides a rationale on why and who 
should do what to correct injustices (Snow and Benford 1988; Oliver and Johnston 
1999; Opp 2009).  Frame alignment, another important concept, represents a step in 
reaching a level of consensus by linking population‘s pre-existing views, interests and 





Klandermans (2013) demonstrate the importance of this concept in their study, 
showing that linking a message of change to a particular aspect of one's identity 
increases mobilization and commitment to collective action goals.  In addition to 
frame alignment, frame resonance is also an important factor in protest mobilization, 
as movements aim to increase the salience and the credibility of the proposed frames 
(Opp 2009, p.260).  All these elements play an important role in protest mobilization 
– having a consistent, credible and a resound message helps movements mobilize 
large numbers of people and, in turn, successfully resist a regime.   
Authorities often question the credibility of protesters and the validity of their 
demands, yet a classification and a systematic study of government frames is lacking 
in the current social movement and state responses literature.  In the paragraphs 
below, I discuss the classification of government frames within the same 
diagnostic/prognostic/motivating framework.  I propose that, both, governments‘ and 
protesters‘ framing processes can be understood within this particular framework 
proposed by the social movements‘ literature.   The one important distinction between 
governments and protesters is that the goals of these two actors differ.   While, protest 
activists seek to create highly resonant mobilization frames, governments on the other 
hand primarily promote frames that disrupt, demobilize and delegitimize protest 
movements.     
In order to effectively respond to a protest, a regime may also need to 
diagnose a source of grievances, consider various scenarios on what the best choice of 
action would be and its consequences as well as provide a reasonable motive for 
people to support their views instead of the views of protest activists.  It is plausible 
that governments and protesters may follow similar steps to assess socio-political 





While some governments may be genuinely interested in understanding a source of 
grievances to improve conditions in a country, others might only be interested in 
containing the uprisings and limiting the challenges that protests pose to their rule.  
For instance, Brazilian Government‘s rhetoric surrounding the passage of the anti-
corruption law in 2013 (Moura 2015) and the announcement of additional anti-
corruption measures in March 2015 (Darlington and Ford 2015)
5
 is an example of the 
Government‘s strategic attempts to align its position with the prevailing anti-
corruption sentiments in the country and to gain control over the protest movement.  
Thus, governments may also seek to align their actions with the needs and views of 
people that they hope to recruit to support their rule.   
The language used by protest activists has also been explored in the social 
movement literature to a certain extent, while language used by government officials 
is rarely examined in a systematic way.  Benford (1993) groups the vocabularies used 
by protest activists to promote mobilization into following categories; severity, 
urgency, efficacy and propriety (p.196).  Severity and urgency vocabularies are meant 
to communicate the gravity of a situation and need for urgent action, while efficacy 
and propriety related words are usually used to impress upon wider population the 
imperative of coming together to achieve common goals (Desrosiers 2012, p. 12).  
This chapter utilizes quantitative text analysis methods such as topic models to 
efficiently and systematically explore numerous newspaper reports, discover most 
dominant topics of discussion and vocabularies used by government officials when 
responding to protest demands  (Mohr  and Bogdanov 2013; Lowe and Benoit 2013; 
Blei et al. 2003).   
                                                          
5
According to Darlington and Ford (2015) and Moura (2015) the announcement of new anti-
corruption measures happens in March 2015, two years after the initial protests.  Protests 
emerge again in August 2015, the protesters call for the President Rousseff‘s resignation in 





Topic models offer possibilities to test framing theories and concepts 
proposed by Benford (1993).  Understanding the protest related discourses requires a 
more detailed study of words that are used to construct particular frames (topics). 
Topic models offer possibilities to investigate the use of words in both, governments‘ 
and protest activists‘ frames, as the model output provides information on the 
probability of each word associated with each topic (frame).  Quantitative analysis of 
texts enables systematic exploration of the estimated topics and relational meanings 
in ways that is not possible with hand-coding of the data (DiMaggio et al. 2013). 
The rhetoric that surrounds protests is a part of strategic decision-making 
processes that involve calculated assessment of the situation by both, governments 
and dissidents.  Entman (2003) claims that ―if the news creates impressions that the 
idea is held widely and intensely by large swaths of the public, it can affect leaders’ 
strategic calculations and activities” (p.420).   While the rhetoric surrounding protest 
events can have a significant impact on protest emergence and outcome, the current 
literature primarily focuses on the use of physical repression such as imprisonments, 
beatings and other forms of state-sponsored violence.  Often, violent rhetoric 
precedes use of physical violence.  The delegitimizing statements by government 
officials, calling protesters traitors and hooligans, can incite regimes‘ security forces 
and their supporters to use physical violence against dissidents.  Thus, delegitimizing 
frames can be considered as a rhetorical version of repression.   Governments may 
rely on these types of frames when they are able to claim the existence of a legitimate 
enemy of the state, equate protesters‘ aims with those of an enemy and convince the 
majority of their population that supporting the protests is a threat to national security 
and survival.  In these situations, a government‘s use of verbal repression might be a 





threat to national interests and peace than a government.   This type of frame could be 
potentially linked to a reduction in number and size of protests, but it could also 
backfire depending on the levels of anger that these kinds of statements might evoke.  
Given the scope and the aim of this chapter, it is not possible to systematically 
investigate regimes‘ strategic use of various types of rhetoric and mobilisation levels.  
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that language can possibly serve as an 
alternative or a precursor for governments‘ use of physical repression.  Similarly, the 
rhetorical statements of support or dismissal also have corresponding examples in 
physical actions such as a government‘s choice to accommodate or ignore protest 
demands.   
In addition to repression, governments can also choose to ignore (Bishara 
2016) protests. Ignore category is rarely studied in the government responses 
literature and the definitions of this category vary.  Bishara (2015) defines the ignore 
response as any government action that appears dismissive of protest participants 
either through inaction or contempt.  Other researchers refer to a government‘s choice 
to ignore protests as a strategic tolerance – a regime allows protest activities only to 
be able to identify who are the dissidents that they can payoff (Cai 2010; Yien and 
Cheng 2017).  Either way, by ignoring or temporarily tolerating protest activities, a 
government‘s primary goal is to undermine protest movement.  The Turkish 
Government‘s choice to evoke nationalist sentiments to justify rebuilding of historical 
structures in Gezi Park (BBC 2016) is an example of the government‘s choice to 
verbally ignore actual protest demands by sidelining the existing grievances.  The 
choice to ignore and/or sideline grievances is a likely option when governments can 





of government frames have a potential to reduce mobilisation levels and garner more 
support for the government by taking attention away from the actual grievances.     
Another possible response is accommodation, a regime‘s choice to accede to 
protest demands (Franklin 2009; Ryckman 2016).  Sympathizing with protesters‘ 
demands can be considered a version of rhetorical accommodation.  The Brazilian 
President‘s choice to respond to protesters‘ demands by defending their right to 
protest despite the calls for the President‘s resignation is an example of verbal 
accommodation (Darlington and Ford 2015).  It is possible that numerous and 
repeated protests over economic issues and corruption in Brazil have led the 
government to concede to protesters demands by passing new anti-corruption laws as 
well as limiting the regime‘s verbal responses to sympathising rather than dismissive 
or discrediting statements.  Economic grievances have a potential to mobilize large 
groups of people which could be more difficult to control and more risky to repress, 
and so sympathising statements might be a better option.  Thus, it is possible that 
governments that face these kinds of threats are more likely to express sympathy 
towards protesters and accommodate their demands.  Other types of the claims such 
as calls for regime change might receive less sympathy from a government as these 
represent a direct challenge to their rule.     
While the question of the relationship between the regimes‘ rhetoric and the 
actual physical actions is worth exploring, that is beyond the aim of this chapter.  The 
point of the comparison and the discussion in the paragraphs above is to build upon 
the existing literature on government responses and propose a categorisation of verbal 
responses.    The use of language can signify certain intentions of a regime, and thus a 





Government narratives serve to demobilize masses and suppress protest 
challenges.  In some cases, regimes choose to address and accommodate grievances, 
while in others, strategic framing is used to either delegitimize protests or offer 
alternative views that trump grievances.  The case of B&H provides a good example 
to study variability in government responses as the country is territorially, 
ideologically and politically divided along ethnic lines.   Ethnic differences and past 
experiences are often exploited by politicians to further divide people and undermine 
a collective anti-regime campaign.  For instance, the RS President Milorad Dodik‘s 
reaction to the 2014 protests in B&H, who repeatedly called for ―an independent RS,‖ 
is an example of the Government leader promoting and maintaining an alternative 
view that sidelined economic grievances that are equally affecting all ethnic groups in 
the country.  The RS government‘s strategy to bypass grievances by evoking a more 
salient issue such as the RS independence from B&H, may help explain low levels of 
protest mobilization in the RS.  In addition to using negative and dismissive language 
to discourage the population in the RS to join the nation-wide protest efforts, 
President Dodik had also used conflicting types of statements to address people in the 
RS by saying  
 
―I am grateful to the citizens of the RS who did not fall for the provocations 
coming from the Federation (FB&H) or their satellites here in the RS (he 
refers here to the potential FB&H sympathizers within the RS), who wanted to 
raise up here in the RS under the facade of solidarity‖ (Vukic, Nezavisne 
Novine, 10
th




The B&H‘s socio-political and territorial divisions (Appendix 6.5) and the 
government structures (2 different entity governments, 1 state) provide a model case 
to study protest discourses and effects of government narratives on protest 





unsatisfactory in both B&H entities, the emergence of protests in the Bosniak-Croat 
dominated FB&H entity and a lack of significant mobilization in the Serb dominated, 
RS entity is puzzling (see Table 3.2).  The paragraphs below provide a detailed 
overview of the B&H country characteristics – political, social, and economic 
conditions that preceded 2014 spring protests.    
 
3.3 Background: What were B&H 2014 protests about? 
 
―We need to get back to what is the real cause of the protests. We should not 
forget what led to them: poverty, unemployment, corruption and injustice. 
These are protests against injustice and corruption, and they should never be 
viewed as a conflict along ethnic lines.” Željko Komšić, Oslobodjenje, 11 
February, 2014 
―Domestic traitors and foreign mercenaries instructed by the FB&H political 
circles, the international community and anti-Serb non-governmental sector" 
Milorad Dodik on who initiated the protests, an interview with Radio and 
Television of Republic of Srpska, as reported in Oslobodjenje (b.), 15
th
 of 
February, 2014   
 
Twenty years after the end of the 1990s ethnic conflict in B&H, demobilized soldiers, 
unemployed and outraged people from all walks of life, have come out to voice their 
despair over years of corruption and exploitation by domestic and international elites 
(Mujanovic and McRobie 2014; Pugh 2005).  While in the eyes of aggrieved B&H 
citizens, the 2014 spring protests were an opportunity to force the corrupt and 
inadequate ruling elites to take the responsibility for their actions, in the eyes of the 
international community, primarily the High Representative for B&H, Valentin 
Inzko, and some Government officials, the protests were seen as a crisis that need to 





entirely farfetched as people in B&H are still struggling to overcome the 
consequences of the 1990s ethnic war.   
Protest gatherings provide a space for people to come together to vocalize and 
learn about individual and collective injustices (McGarty et al., 2013).  Protests can 
be a unifying force in a society that seeks to collectively confront government 
injustices, however, protests can also deepen societal divides as various individuals 
and groups express their goals and views.  This chapter illustrates the complexities 
that arise with initiating nonviolent resistance in ethnically diverse states.  Salient 
ethnic identities can prevent people from engaging in a collective, peaceful action 
against a state or even worse, result in violent conflicts such as the case of Syria 
illustrates.        
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) has ended the conflict in the B&H, but it 
did not end ethnic grievances and injustices.  With the Bosniak-Croat coalition forces 
on one side and the Serb forces on the other, the ethnic war has claimed many lives 
on all sides and displaced numerous people from their homes (Stefanovic and 
Loizides 2011). The International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia 
proceedings have not led to an improvement in ethnic relations (Dojčinović 2012).  
The country is still territorially divided with the Bosniak and Croat population 
primarily living in the FB&H entity and the Serb population residing in the RS.  
Nonetheless, it is still possible that familial and friendship ties that existed in B&H 
prior to the 1990s conflict and the limited networks of cooperation that were build in 
the post-conflict period could help improve the ethnic group relations in the future.  
According to Skoko (2010) survey results, ethnic groups in B&H have both, negative 
and positive views of each other, with Bosniaks perceiving Serbs as cruel and 





Bosniaks for their hospitality and loyalty to their faith, but also think of them as 
hypocritical; and both Bosniaks and Serbs admiring Croats for their commitment to 
preserving their culture.  Past experiences and existing stereotypes can present a 
barrier for collective action as governments may choose to exploit these to disrupt 
protest mobilization.   
In addition to the presence of ethnic divides, the B&H suffers from high levels 
of unemployment. Table 3.1 summarizes the levels of unemployment on the national 
and entity levels for the 2012-2014 period (Labour Force Survey 2014, p, 31-32).  
The unemployment estimates are even higher in some other reports, ranging from 
44%-60%, with estimates that every 6
th
 citizen in B&H is living below the poverty 
line (Dedic 2013; p.2; Ceriani and Ruggeri 2015).  Patronage networks, institutional 
inefficiencies and culture of impunity are widespread, and as a result, the violations 
of worker‘s and human rights are numerous and rarely persecuted (Dedic 2013).  
Cronyism and nepotism permeate every level of B&H society and people are often 
forced to resort to bribery to secure services and jobs in health, safety, administrative 
and other areas (UNODC Report 2011).  Overall, the total level of social exclusion as 
measured by three indicators (risk of poverty, financial depravation and labour 
intensity) is slightly higher in the RS (52.6%) than the FB&H (45.6%), however, with 
both scores close to half of the population feeling marginalized (Ceriani and Ruggeri 








Table 3.1 Total unemployment rates in FB&H, RS and B&H, 2012-2014, by gender. 
 
Despite the high levels of economic and social grievances, mass scale protests 
are rare, with the exception of protests in 2014.  One possible reason for low numbers 
of protests is a lack of common vision in the country.  International Crisis Group 
report (ICG 2014) describes this lack of unity in the country in their report – ―loved 
by some of her citizens, barely tolerated by others, Bosnia lacks a common narrative‖ 
(p.17).  A lack of common ties, existence of ethnic divides and a governments‘ 
framing of protest events could help explain the differences in the observed 
mobilization trends in the two B&H entities as presented in Table 3.2 (Belgioioso, 
Gleditsch and Vidović 2017). 
Table 3.2 Number of protest events and participants (see Belgioioso, Gleditsch and 










N of protest 
participants in a 
single day 
FB&H 77 12 13 000 
RS 
6* (2 pro-
government) 0      300 
 
In addition to the high unemployment rate, the B&H bureaucracy is one of the 
most complex and most costly in the region, with the allocations for civil servant 
% 
Male  Female  
Total 
2012 Male  Female  
Total 
2013 Male  Female  
Total 
2014 
FB&H 27.7 32.2 29.4 27.1 28.4 27.6 25.7 32.7 28.4 
RS 23.8 28.2 25.6 25.3 29.5 27.0 23.8 28.4 25.7 





wages being the highest in Europe (ICG 2014, p.25; Dedic 2013, p.4).  The country 
quite literally cannot afford its system of governance, which was always designed as a 
temporary structure as a part of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA).  The power-
sharing arrangement between the three major ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats and 
Serbs) and the size of the bureaucracy has contributed to ineffectiveness and 
corruption across all levels of governance (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014).  The mutual 
trust between the different political institutions is low and the disagreements over the 
implementation of the DPA are frequent (ICG 2014; Søberg 2008).  The RS 
institutions have a simpler structure, with a strong executive control by a directly-
elected President and the Prime Minister, which has resulted in a slightly more 
effective legislature in the RS (ICG 2014, p.18, 22). The FB&H President is 
appointed by the FB&H Parliament, the government is less centralized as it consists 
of 10 cantons (administrative units), each with its own administrative government and 
ministers (ICG 2014; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014).  Doing business in either entity is 
quite difficult and the government officials hold share in all the major private and 
public companies (ICG 2014, p.13).  Thus, the only observable difference between 
the two entities is a certain degree of simplicity and efficiency of the RS government, 
however, the economic conditions in the RS entity are not more favourable in 
comparison to the FB&H.       
The FB&H and the RS are similar in another aspect; there is a distinct pro-
government/pro-ethnic bias in the majority of the media outlets in both entities.  
According to the World Press Trends (2009) report, there are around 180 broadcasters 
in the B&H (145 radio stations and 43 television stations), but, despite the plurality of 
the sources, people in both entities are mainly exposed to polarized and biased 





Regardless of the bias in the news reporting, the plurality and the availability 
of information in the B&H suggest that the differences in the protest mobilization 
levels between the FB&H and the RS cannot be attributed a lack of the freedom of 
press and the access to information.  The three national public broadcasters, state-
wide B&HRT, entity-wide RTVFB&H and RTRS, seem to be the most available, 
popular and trustworthy news sources (Open Society 2012, p.19, p.23).  Based on the 
surveys reported in the Open Society (2012) report, the number of internet users in 
2011 has reached 55%, more than ¾ of the B&H internet users, aged 10-75 use 
internet every day, several times a day, with 15-24 year olds being 93% of the users 
(p.19, 22).  With the 11 daily newspapers, 103 magazines, 8 religious journals, and 75 
other publications, B&H print media is the next most common source of news (Open 
Society 2012, p.25).  However, the circulation of any major daily news source does 
not go above 20 000 per year (World Press Trends (2009 p.259) and even less in 
recent years (INFOBIRO).  The TV transcripts are not readily available; so the next 
best sources of information on protests were daily news sources (see Data and 
Method section).  The daily news journals often cover the TV reports, in particular 
interviews given by the political leaders and protest activists.  The daily news sources 
used in this study are also increasing their online presence, with Nezavisne Novine, 
the RS based newspaper, ranking number 24 out of 100 most visited online news 
portals in the B&H (Alexa Web Analytics 2015).  The news sources selected in this 
study offer daily accounts of protest actions and discourses in the B&H during the 
2014 spring protests.   
Presence of economic grievance and communication technologies that 
facilitate coordination and communication seem not to be sufficient to explain the 





favouritism, bias and the resort to one‘s pro-ethnic news sources to stay informed 
have facilitated isolation and mistrust among members of various ethnic groups.  It is 
likely that under these conditions the B&H Government officials have strategically 
choose to exploit the existence of ethnic cleavages and a lack of common vision 
among the B&H citizens to undermine protest mobilization. The following 
paragraphs present evidence for the types of frames used by the B&H Government to 
respond to 2014 protest events.   
 
3.4 Data and Method 
 
Two major daily B&H newspaper sources, Oslobodjenje and Nezavisne 
Novine, were used to explore the framing of the protest events.  Oslobodjenje is based 
in the capital Sarajevo, located in the FB&H entity, and is one of the oldest and most 
read newspapers in B&H, with mostly Bosniak audience (Open Society 2012).  
Nezavisne Novine is based in Banjaluka, the RS capital.  It is a highly circulated news 
source and primarily read by the Serb population (European Journalism Centre 2007).  
The news articles were extracted from INFOBIRO, the first and the only digital 
database of all B&H news reports over the last 50 years, with Oslobodjenje averaging 
26 articles daily and Nezavisne Novine around 17 (INFOBIRO 2015).
6
  The articles 
used in the analysis were restricted to the month of February given that the majority 
of the protest activities have emerged during this month (Belgioioso, Gleditsch and 
Vidović 2017).  The total number of news articles from both sources for February 
2014 was 863.   
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 The author would like to extend special thanks to Dragan Golubović, INFOBIRO Digital 
Archive, for his excellent and timely communication with the access to the database and 





I have used regular expressions to identify protest related articles, resulting in 
285 articles out of total 863 (protest mutiny rebellion strike spring riot protesters 
demonstrators plenum assemblies).  Figure 3.1 illustrates the distribution of protest 
related articles during the month of February, with an increase in protest activity 
between 8-15
th
 of February, the height of protest activities (see Belgioioso, Gleditsch 
and Vidović 2017 for protest event analyses).  Figure 3.1 also shows that Nezavisne 
Novine do not publish on Sundays.  After a detailed review of the articles that emerge 
after 24
th
 of February, I have found that these articles are primarily opinion pieces and 
less likely to include any direct statements by government officials, which provides 
additional support for my choice to only focus on the month of February.   
One of the potential weaknesses of the data and the analyses here is that I 
assume that the media reports reflect the Government‘s rhetoric and framing of 
protest responses.  A news report is a hybrid of information, ranging from the direct 
quotes and statements made by the Government leaders to sentences describing the 
context in which protests emerged, to reactions by the world leaders and political 
pundits.  While it can be argued that the government framing cannot be directly 
inferred through news reports, after the manual review of the news articles I have 
found that the majority of the articles included in this analysis contain the statements 
made by one or more government officials.  Newspaper reports are a common source 
of information used in other protest studies and data collection efforts such as the 
NAVCO 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) which is used to conduct 







Figure 3.1 Nezavisne Novine (NN) and Oslobodjenje (OS) count of protest related 
daily articles for February 2014.   The x-axis shows the dates, y-count of the protest 






3.4.1 Topic Modelling  
 
The basic idea behind generative topic models, such as latent Dirichlet allocation 
(LDA), is that there is a generative process that ―produced‖ the collection of 
documents (ex. protest events-more protest related news articles), and that while the 
documents/words are observed, the topics are unobserved, latent, hidden structures 
that have likely generated the observed collection of documents (Blei, 2012 p.78).  
Topics are comprised of a set of words that frequently co-occur together.  Each word 
can be found in multiple topics, with different probability, and so each topic has its 
own distribution over words.  Similarly, each document can contain multiple topics 
and each document has its own distribution over topics (Blei 2012).   The LDA is a 
clustering algorithm that can be used to discover which topics are represented in a 





are used.  Each observation can have more than 1 cluster as the same word can belong 
to different topics. In this chapter, frame and topic concepts are used interchangeably.    
Topic models such as LDA are used to estimate topics from a collection of 
documents as well as to obtain per-document topic distribution and per-word topic 
assignment, seeking to find the hidden structures by reversing the generative process 
(Blei 2012 p.79).  In addition to the measurement of latent variables, researchers are 
also eager to explore ways in which document-level information such as author, date 
or location of published article influence the content of the text (Roberts et al 2016, 
p.1).   The newly developed, Structural Topic Model (STM) approach, a variant of the 
LDA (Blei et al 2003) algorithm, offers possibilities for a more detailed exploration 
of how information such as the name of the publication and the publishing date may 
influence the content of the text (Mishler et al. 2015, p.640; Roberts et al. 2015).  
This type of additional information is referred to as metadata.    
The current study utilizes the STM model to examine variations in topic 
prevalence during the 2014 spring protests (see Roberts et al. 2015 for a detailed 
discussion of model specifications).  A set of newspaper reports represents a corpus 
from which certain characteristics of a source and a message can be inferred (Roberts 
2000).  The STM outcome consists of a set of latent, unobservable topics and their 
associated words (Roberts et al. 2015).  The STM output, topic, is interpreted in 
relation to the words that co-occur together and capture a theme, a topic of discussion 
for a particular time period.  The output also provides a possibility of capturing the 
prevalence with which each topic occurs in a set of documents for a period of interest. 
Thus, topic models help us with studying forms that state discourses take during 





The current model incorporates covariates such as the newspaper source as 
well as the publication date.  In the case of B&H, ethnic location where the 
newspaper is published could have an effect on how much each topic is discussed and 
promoted given that the readership and the ownership of the print media in B&H is 
strongly divided along ethnic, entity and political party lines (Open Society 
2012p.26).  This covariate is used to assess topical prevalence, the frequency with 
which topic is covered in the RS in comparison to the FB&H daily news media, and it 
is included as a binary variable (Roberts et al. 2015, p.4).       
The extent to which the outcome of the STM is interpretable greatly depends 
on ―the statistical structure of observed language and how it interacts with the 
specific probabilistic assumptions of STM‖ (Blei 2012).  Mishler et al. (2015) have 
applied the STM to study differences in topic prevalence regarding the MH 17 plane 
crash in Ukraine using Russian language tweets and the model seem to have 
performed well in regards to the language structure and the content being examined.   
Bosniak/Croatian/Serbian languages belong to a category of Slavic languages and it is 
expected that the model will perform similarly well.  The data is structured so that 
each row represents a separate observation, starting with a column of text (the content 
of a newspaper article per day), followed by a date, a newspaper indicator (Nezavisne 
Novine-NN, Oslobodjenje-OS) and the unique newspaper article ID.  The final corpus 
contains 285 documents, 12143 unique terms and 79654 tokens.    
The data was pre-processed using the natural language tools developed by a 
team at the University of Zagreb (Ljubešić et al. 2007; FFZG 2016) as well as the 
tools available through the tm R package (Rinker, 2013; Feinerer and Hornik, 2015).  
Even though B&H has three official languages, Bosniak, Croatian and Serbian, all 





The language differences are minimal and thus do not play a significant role in the 
terms of grammar structure and the types of the words used in journalistic writing.  In 
addition, both newspaper sources use the same Latin alphabet (Serbian language also 
uses a Cyrillic alphabet).  The current project uses domestic news reports, and so the 
processing of the text had to be modified to include tools from both, the University of 





The stm searchK function was used to determine the optimal number of topics using 
held-out likelihood that estimates the probability of words appearing within a 
document when those words have been removed (Roberts et al. 2014, p.41).   Based 
on the Figure 3.2 below, it seems that 10 is the most appropriate number of topics for 
this corpus, and that any number after 15 would produce topics that would pick up 
too much noise from the data.   
The validation of unsupervised models of text is an important part of the 
discussion when reporting the results.  A standard way to perform as a first step in 
validating the topic models such as STM is to be able to assign appropriate labels to 
the topics in the model output (Grimmer and Stewart 2013).   Out of the 10 estimated 
topics,   topic 1 seems particularly interesting in the terms of prevalence in the corpus 
as well as the associated words as Figure 3.3 illustrates.  I have sampled 20 
documents associated with the topic 1, manually reviewed those and determined that 
topic 1 for example is a common topic across the selected documents.  The next step 
was to assign labels for each topic in the output (10 topics) that reflect the common 
theme based on the words that co-occur together in this particular topic.   Following 





based on the associated words.  The Figure 3.3 shows the types of the labels that I 
have assigned to the topics:  alternative, delegitimizing and sympathizing frames.  
The Figure 3.3 only displays 6 topics as these seem to be the most relevant in terms 
of the government frames.  The output with 10 topics in the Appendix 6.4.  
 






Figure 3.3, Topic Proportion column, shows that the most prevalent topic is 
Topic 5 with 0.18 topic proportion prevalence in the corpus.  The Topic 5 has the 
largest proportion of the corpora, consisting of words that are more associated with 
protesters‘ actions (government, presidency, building, protesters, canton, fire, 
demonstrators, attack, citizens) and less with grievances and goals.  Words associated 
with Topic 5 such as fire, building and attack indicate that the protesters may have 
potentially engaged in violence.   The words in Topic 10 (RS protesters actions), 
slightly less dominant topic (.09 topic proportion) also seem to be mainly related to 
protesters actions.  The topics related to the protesters‘ actions do not seem to contain 
almost any words that may point to protesters‘ demands, goals or any mobilization 
related vocabularies.  It appears that the protesters‘ violent actions have received 





war veterans have expressed some anger (gnjev) and views regarding a lack of fair 
treatment given their great sacrifices during the 1990s conflict.  Thus, Topics 5 and 
10 are not labelled with any protest activists types of frames since these appear to be 
































Associated Words  
Topics:  Number and 




Dodik, president, peoples, 
emphasized, pointed out, FBH, 
Milorad confidence, 
independence, international, 
Banjaluka, referendum, analysis, 
autonomy, Drina, energetic, euro, 
fund, church T1—RS independence   Alternative View .17 
republic, srpska, government, 
Dodik, citizens, enemies, 
numerous, conspiracy, story, 
republic, nongovernmental, 
theory, argument, traitors 
T7—RS Officials discredit 
protests Delegitimizing .03 
    
government, cantons, citizens, 
police, demonstrators, Nefic, 
Lipovaca, Konjuh, last night, 
street, workers, drugs, hungry, 
spokesperson, rowdy, Konjuh, 
traffic, found, last night 
T3—FB&H Officials 
discredit protests Delegitimizing .14 
FBH, protests, Izetbegovic, 
president, Komsic, 
presidency,program, Vucic, 
Komsic, needed, meeting, 
injustice, Milanovic,line, conflict, 
corruption, inter-ethnic, inter-
religious, peaceful, national 
T2—B&H national and 
FB&H Officials supports 
protests Sympathizing .11 
    
government, citizens, FBH, 
presidency, building, 
demonstrator, cantons, 
municipality, fire, attack, outside, 
cantonal, give, main, citizen, 
come out, Kalesiji, Marsala T5—FBH protesters actions  .18 
citizens, RSa, protest, 
government, fighters, power, 
elements, communities, return, 
soldiers, veterans, labour, came, 
former, work, anger, especially, 





The frames promoted by the political leaders seem to trump those proposed by 
the protest activists in the terms of the proportion of the government frames (topic 
proportions) in the corpus and in the terms of salient use of language.  While activists 
mobilization frames are less prominent (topics 5 and 10), the use of the delegitimizing 
and disruptive frames by the government is dominating the context of the 2014 B&H 
protests (topics, 1, 7, 3, 2), as can be seen in Figure 3.3.   
Based on the words associated with Topic 1 (RS independence), this topic can 
be described as being related to the RS government‘s attempts to promote an 
alternative view of the socio-political conditions.  Topic 1 includes the terms related 
to the autonomy and the independence of the RS, referendum, international 
community, FB&H and confidence.  The RS President, Milorad Dodik, has claimed 
that the protests are strategic attempts by the FB&H government and international 
community aimed at jeopardizing the RS sovereignty and security (Sisic and 
Sajinovic 2014; Vukic 2014).  President Dodik has often expressed a lack of 
confidence in the FB&H leadership in the past (Vukic 2014), and even more so 
during the spring 2014 protests.   
According to the Figure 3.4 both, the RS and the FB&H newspapers, have 
reported on the President Dodik‘s calls for the RS independence, with the content of 
the several newspaper articles primarily dedicated to the RS independence discussion, 
particularly during the peak of the protest activity (mid February, with over 0.80 of 
the documents/newspaper articles related to this topic).  Based on the overall topic 
proportion value in the corpus (0.17) and the words associated with it, it seems that 
the most dominant government protest frame in the RS was the issue of 
independence.  Raising the issue of the RS independence during the protests might 





important issues of unemployment, poverty and government inefficiency.  This frame 
sideline protest demands and grievances, offering an alternative, competing and 
highly salient view of socio-political conditions, a view that potentially trumps 
existing grievances.  This type of the frame can be classified as the government 
attempt to ignore pressing economic grievances by evoking ethnically salient issue 
such as the RS autonomy.  
 
Figure 3.4 The number of the documents (circle radius) and the proportion of the 
document content that relates to the Topic 1, RS independence, (x axis) over the 




Topic 2 (B&H/FB&H Officials support protests) includes the words of 
support such as injustices, corruption, inter-ethnic, inter-religious, peaceful, and 
national with the names of Komšić, the Chairperson of the Presidency of B&H at that 





highest probability in this topic as Figure 3.3 shows.  Topic 2 can be interpreted as a 
supportive type of the frame, used mainly by the high ranking B&H politicians on the 
national level who primarily represent the interests of the FB&H ethnic groups, in 
this case:  Bosnian Bosniaks (Izetbegović) and Bosnian Croats (Komšić).   This frame 
could be classified as accommodation by the political leaders, but can also be a 
disruptive type of action, where by sympathizing with the protesters, the government 
is seeking to bring people to their side and effectively reduce potential for mass 
mobilization.   
Figure 3.5, Topic 2, indicates that the support for the protesters have been 
expressed in numerous documents/newspaper articles, however, only with a brief 
mention in comparison to the overall document content.   The values on the x axis 
indicate that for the majority of the newspaper reports, proportion of the newspaper 
article that relates to the support for the protesters is below 0.20. The articles that 






 appear to contain the most discussion 













Figure 3.5 The number of the documents (circle radius) and the proportion of the 
document content that relates to the Topic 2, B&H/FB&H Officials support protests, 




Topic 3 as shown in the Figure 3.3 (FB&H officials discredit protests) 
includes some of the words seen in previous topics such as the government, citizens, 
protesters, and other words specific only to this topic such as Nefic, police, drugs, 
discovered, and hungry.  The spokesperson for the Sarajevo Canton Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, Irfan Nefić, has allegedly said that the drugs and some weapons have 
been found among the protesters (Malisević 2014).   The following day, the statement 
has been retracted by the spokesman himself, according to The Istinomjer, an online 
platform for monitoring the truthfulness of the statements and events in B&H, 
however, the report that the drugs have been found were then repeated by other 
political leaders on the TV stations (Istinomjer 2014).  These and similar attempts by 





framing of protesters as hooligans in order to discredit their grievances and claims.   
Topic 3 related articles seem to appear rarely in both NN and OS - except for couple 






 of February as Figure 3.6 shows.    
 
 
Figure 3.6 The number of the documents (circle radius) and the proportion of the 
document content that relates to the Topic 3, FB&H officials discredit protests (x 





The Topic 7 (RS Officials discredit protests) includes numerous words that 
were used to discredit and discourage people in the RS entity to join the protests.  
This particular frame contains the following words:  republic, Srpska, government, 
Dodik, citizens, enemies, conspiracy, plot, traitors, clearly capturing Dodik‘s 





join protests as traitors and enemies.  The topic accounts for a small portion of the 
corpus (.03) in comparison to the other topics, nonetheless, it contains a great number 
of salient words that might have a negative effect on protest mobilization.  The use of 
salient words such as traitors and conspiracy may have helped the RS leadership to 
create highly resonant frames that could have a demobilizing effect.  The frames 
employed by the RS government are to a great extent similar to the frames used by 
the Turkish government in 2013 during the Gezi Park protests.     
In summary, the population in the RS was mainly exposed to the frames that 
ignored the grievances and offered an alternative vision of socio-political conditions, 
while the population in the FB&H entity has been equally exposed to discrediting and 
supportive types of frames, as well as to a great deal of information on protesters‘ 
activities.  The RS leadership has ignored and sidelined protesters‘ claims by shifting 
the discussion to the future of the RS in B&H, a topic that is highly salient in the RS.   
 
 
3.6 Discussion  
 
Automated quantitative text analysis methods have a potential to advance our 
understanding of framing processes and protest mobilization trends.   These methods 
could be proven useful in integrating protest event data such as protest size and 
location with the other protest related attributes such as frames.  In this way, the 
significance of protest frames and other mobilization related factors such as 
resources, organizational and network related structures could be tested in a more 
systematic way.   
Overall, the topics that I have identified using the STM model mainly reflect 
the government frames and less so the protest activists‘ frames.   The only topics that 





their demands and grievances.  While the frames used by the political leaders have an 
easily identifiable message, protesters‘ related topics contain words that are less 
illustrative of protest claims or goals.  These results could be interpreted in two ways: 
either the government has a considerable advantage in spreading own interpretations 
of protest events or protest activists were unable to create credible and resonant 
frames that would capture enough attention to be reported by the news sources.  It is 
possible that a lack of common vision and the presence of ethnic divides have 
negatively affected the efforts by the protest activists to effectively communicate their 
views regarding the B&H socio-political conditions and the high levels of economic 




This chapter demonstrates the usefulness of the automated data coding and analysis 
methods and provides detailed examination of government framing of protest events. 
Based on the STM model output, the government frames can be are categorized into 
three categories: delegitimizing (ex. calling protesters traitors), demobilizing 
(sympathetic statements), and alternative views (sidelining/ignoring grievances).  The 
findings illustrate the differences in the vocabularies and the types of the frames used 
by the Government officials in the two B&H entities.  While the RS government has 
mainly used the frames to shift the discussion from protest related grievances to a 
more salient issue such as the independence and autonomy of the RS (Topic 1), the 
FB&H has engaged in both, delegitimizing and sympathizing framing of the protest 
events.  The RS officials‘ frames were more about building independent, stronger and 
better RS, without directly addressing protesters‘ claims.  This type of the frame 





the citizens in this entity are mainly in the favour of the RS being independent from 
B&H.   The fear of being dominated by other ethnic group/s is still present in the 
country due to ethnic and territorial divides.  This sentiment is particularly present in 
the RS given that Serbs (majority population) confronted the Bosniak-Croat coalition 
during the 1990s conflict.  Also, Serbs, have received numerous condemnations from 
the wider international community during and after the 1990s conflict.  Thus, it is 
possible that some people in the RS saw the protests as a threat by the Bosniak-Croat 
and international community as the President Dodik claimed and decided not to 
participate in protests.  This could also help explain why the RS government choose 
not to acknowledge grievances, and instead was able to either ignore or discredit 
protesters by calling them traitors.  The differences in the RS and FB&H 
governments‘ framing of the 2014 B&H protests to some extent help explain why 
protests mainly emerge in FB&H, Bosniak-Croat dominated entity.    
One could also argue that because the number of protest events in the RS 
entity was low, the RS government could afford to focus on the independence issue 
instead on responding to grievances. The endogeneity problem in this case could be 
potentially addressed by examining the levels of support that the RS President 
Milorad Dodik and his party enjoyed in a period of time before the protests.  
According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014) report President Dodik was facing 
allegations of corruption and mismanagement of public funds prior to the protests and 
his party did not enjoy high levels of support since 2010 elections.  Thus, given the 
weak level of support towards President Dodik‘s Government, the choice of the 
regime officials, in particular President Dodik, to re-focus the discussion from 
economic grievances towards the independence of the RS was most likely a strategy 





I do not claim that based on the results in this study that there is a causal relationship 
between the government frames and protest mobilization levels observed in the RS in 
comparison to the FB&H.  I address the potential problem of endogeneity here for the 
purpose of future study.  I plan to further investigate the effects of government frames 
on mobilization levels by merging the outcomes of this analysis with the size of 
protests and government responses to test the proposed causal relationship.    
This chapter contributes to the current literature by examining protest frames 
proposed by both, governments and protest activists, with a primary focus 
government frames.  As can be seen in this study, governments utilize various 
framing strategies, from highlighting disruptive aspects of protests and portraying 
protesters as criminals, misfits and agitators to proposing alternative interpretation of 
issues and events that sideline grievances as it was the case in the RS.  The B&H 
officials have also engaged in exploiting ethnic divides and spreading fear and 
divisions among ethnic groups.  In some cases, government officials, in particular 
those from the FB&H also sought to align their aims with those of protesters by 
engaging in accommodative types of activities.  Given the advantage that most 
governments have in spreading the information, these types of strategies can be quite 
effective in reducing protest mobilization potential.    
Interestingly, the FB&H government has equally engaged in both, 
sympathizing and delegitimizing frames by acknowledging grievances and demands 
(Topic 2) as well as attempting to discredit the protesters (Topic 3).   This type of 
government action is described in the protest literature as inconsistency response and 
is found to have a positive effect dissent, leading to an increase in mobilization levels 
(Lichbach 1987; Rasler 1996).  Thus, it is possible that the protesters have perceived 





grievances has come from the top political leaders and representatives of FB&H 
constituent people (Croats and Bosniaks), leading to a larger mobilization in this 
entity.  Additionally, the FB&H leaders were unable to place the blame on the 
outsider‘s influence given that the FB&H officials have positive relations with the 
Western states, while the RS politicians were able to evoke anti-Western sentiments 
due to the NATO‘s involvement in the bombing of the RS and Serbian territories 
during the 1990s conflict.   
In conclusion, it appears that the Government‘s framing of protest events, a 
lack of common vision in the country, and the existence of ethnic cleavages  have 
trumped the economic grievances and efforts to improve the conditions in the B&H.  
A lack of interest and motivation to join others to address political and economic 
issues in the country was particularly evident by the Bosnian Serb‘s low levels of 
mobilization.  Given the presence of ethnically salient cleavages, post-conflict related 
traumas and mistrust between the RS and FB&H populations, the frames used by the 
RS President might have had prevented people in the RS from protesting out of fear 
that protests are/or could be used against the RS entity.    
The findings above demonstrate that governments‘ verbal statements can be 
classified into distinct categories.  The proposed categories – delegitimizing, 
demobilising, alternative views – emerge as the outcome of government framing of 
2014 protests in B&H.  It appears that similar types of frames are also used by the 
government officials in other states, such as Brazil and Turkey.  For instance, both, 
Turkish and B&H leaders, have engaged in sidelining the grievances (alternative 
views) and delegitimizing the protest participants.  Given that this study employs 
automated text analysis tools such as the STM, the proposed government frames 





framework that could be used to evaluate government framing of protest events in 
other cases.   
The findings in this study also provide additional contributions to the protest 
framing literature in relation to the frames proposed by the protest activists.  While 
the literature provides a theoretical framework for the protest activists‘ frames, these 
types of frames are yet to be systematically evaluated using a large sample of texts. 
The findings in this study show that the frames proposed by protest activists appear to 
be less coherent and not as easily identifiable as the frames proposed by the 
government leaders.  These findings confirm the expectations that governments might 
have a considerable advantage in promoting their views and framing of protest events 
which could have a significant effect on the mobilisation levels and movement 
success.  In the case of B&H, the news reports were primarily about protesters 
engaging in violence and less so about their demands, which could have a negative 
effect on the overall interest to collectively mobilise against the corrupt and 
ineffective government.  Thus, the current study illustrates the importance to taking 
into account both, activists‘ and governments‘ framing of protest events when 
examining the effect of verbal responses on mobilisation levels.  Protest frames are a 
result of the dynamic interaction between protest activists, governments and a wider 
society.  Significant progress has been made in the current protest literature, however, 
more work is needed to understand what makes people more or less likely to mobilize 
and join collective action.  A better understanding of to the discourses surrounding 
grievances and goals and ways in which governments engage in framing processes, 
will greatly contribute to the better understanding of the dynamics of protest 





















































Repression is not the only available tactic that a regime can use to respond to dissent, 
yet the majority of the current literature focuses on repression as the primary 
response.  The view that governments inevitably respond to dissent with repression is 
referred to as the Law of Coercive Responsiveness.  Protests do pose a threat to a 
regime‘s power, but as some are more threatening than others, a regime‘s responses 
are likely to vary. This chapter examines the conditions that shape regimes‘ perceived 
levels of threat and a choice to ignore, accommodate or repress protest events.  The 
Mass Mobilization Data (MMD), the first and only dataset that codes various types of 
government responses, is used to examine a relationship between protest attributes 
and government responses.  The results in this study show that a choice to ignore 
protests is the most common response, contrary to the Law of Coercive 
Responsiveness which sees repression as the dominant strategy.  The results also 
indicate that the probability of ignoring increases as the protest size increases, 
contradicting another view in the literature, the threat-response theory which states 
that repression increases with an increase in threat levels (increase in the number of 
protest participants).  The findings show that governments are more likely to ignore 
protests with up to 1000 participants, and more likely to accommodate than repress 
protests above 100 000.  In addition, protests with rights related demands are most 
likely to be repressed, while production (wages, taxes, food costs, land issues) are 









An estimated two million Egyptian workers engaged in more than 3000 protests for 
several years leading up to 2011, only to be largely ignored by the then President 
Hosni Mubarak‘s regime (Bishara 2015; Abdalla 2012).  Even though pharmacists, 
farmers, textile workers, and others frequently gathered in front of the government 
offices in Cairo and demanded socioeconomic changes during the 2004-2010 period, 
the Government rarely responded (Bishara 2015; Abdalla 2012; Los Angeles Times 
2009).  The exception was a Kefaya, Arabic for ―enough‖, anti-Mubarak campaign 
that lasted for five years between 2000-2005 and was able to secure some social and 
political reforms (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).  Interestingly, the Egyptian 
Government took more notice of protest activities post-2010, starting with the violent 
repression of the Tahrir Square protests in January 2011 (PBS 2011).  Why did 
Egypt‘s historically repressive government choose to tolerate numerous mass protests 
prior to 2011?  A lack of repression in this case is puzzling for two reasons; the 
regime‘s historical disregard for human rights and freedoms and a trend in the 
literature which suggests that governments tend to respond to dissent with repression 
(Davenport 2007).  Events in Egypt imply that a government‘s use of repression may 
not be as common as the literature suggests.                               
Protests pose a threat to a regime‘s power, but as some are more threatening 
than others, a regime‘s responses are likely to vary.  Despite the possibility of varied 
responses, the current literature on government and dissident actions mainly explores 
the use of repression, inferring that repression is an expected response to protest 
events.  According to Davenport (2007), the tendency of a state to respond to 
contentious challenges with repression is the most consistent finding in the current 





of Coercive Responsiveness.  While an aim of any state apparatus is to eliminate or 
reduce potential challenges to its power and to deter any such activities in the future, 
repression may not be the most effective or possible choice in some cases.  
Repression is costly and it puts a strain on a state‘s resources and brings into question 
the legitimacy of a regime to govern.  For instance, the Egyptian Government‘s 
decision to violently repress the Tahrir Square protest event on 25 January 2011 
backfired, resulting in a wide-spread mass mobilization within and across the 
country‘s borders (PBS 2011).  Nonetheless, there are cases where swift and violent 
state repression ended and discouraged mass mobilization in years to come; one such 
example being Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989. It seems that, The Law of 
Coercive Responsiveness (―authorities generally employ some form of repressive 
action to counter or eliminate the behavioural threat‖) may be applicable in some 
cases and not others (Davenport 2007, p.7).  Thus, this chapter examines the 
conditions that shape regimes‘ perceived levels of threat and subsequent responses to 
dissent.     
Repression is not the only available tactic that a regime can use to respond to 
dissent, yet, the majority of the current literature focuses on repression as a single 
response mode (Tilly 1978; Gurr 1986; Davenport 2000; Davenport 2007; Earl, 
Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Hendrix and Salehyan 2016).  A few studies have also 
exclusively examined a state‘s choice to accede to protest demands, a response 
referred to in the literature on dissent as an accommodation or concession (Ryckman 
2016; Steinhardt 2016).  Focusing only on one type of state response limits our 
understanding of the conditions that increase the probability of one response over 
others (Franklin 2009).  Studies that examine state responses beyond repression 





America; Carey 2006: 6 Latin American and 3 African states), single-case studies 
(Rasler 1996: Iranian Revolution; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003: case of protest 
policing in New York State) or claim specific analyses such as Brancati‘s (2016) 
work on democracy protests.  The one exception is the work of Klein and Regan 
(forthcoming) that explores the relationship between protest related concession and 
disruption costs and various state responses in a cross-national sample.  They develop 
a composite index of concession and disruption costs, making theoretical assumptions 
about what constitutes low and high cost.  In contrast, I explore how various protest 
characteristics relate to a government‘s choice of response.  In particular, I study 
whether and how protest attributes such as size, demands and tactics shape 
governments‘ perceived levels of threat and consequently their choice to ignore, 
accommodate or repress protest events.  Therefore, this chapter contributes to the 
current literature by presenting a systematic empirical analysis of protest event 
characteristics and government responses on a global sample of 161 countries 
between 1990-2016.  For this purpose, I use the Mass Mobilization Data (MMD) by 
Clark and Reagan (2016), which is the first and only data to code both protest events 
and a wide range of government responses in one dataset.   
While the current literature provides some insights into a choice to repress or 
accommodate protest demands, it mostly neglects the option for a state to refrain from 
using either response.  How likely are governments to choose neither repression nor 
concession? Only a handful of studies primarily explore the ignore category, using 
mostly qualitative and case-study approaches (Bishara 2015; Yien and Cheng 2017).  
Moreover, the concept and measure of the ignore category is not clearly defined or 
agreed upon in the current literature (Franklin 2009; Bishara 2015; Yien and Cheng 





as well as analysis based discussion regarding this particular choice.  Overall, in this 
chapter I contribute to the current literature by using a quantitative approach to assess 
various governments‘ responses to protest events; repression, accommodation and 
ignore.      
It is surprising that the ignore category is rarely studied given that a choice to 
ignore protests may be more common, if not more common than repression and 
accommodation.  For example, Franklin (2009) finds that in Latin America between 
1981 and 1955 the ignore category represents 50% of total state responses compared 
to repression (30%) and concession (20%).  While some protests may seem too big to 
ignore, it is possible that under certain conditions the choice to ignore a large protest 
may be less costly than the choice to repress or accommodate its demands.  On the 
other hand, in some cases ignoring even small-scale protests may be costly as it could 
lead to an increase in protest participation, and thus, some type of responses would be 
a better than none.  In sum, in this chapter I present a theoretical argument and 
empirical test of the variability in regime responses to protest events.   
The sections below provide theoretical and empirical evidence, and 
conceptual discussion regarding the variability of government responses to protest 
events as well as protest event characteristics used to assess protest-related threats.  
4.2 Government Responses: Repression, Accommodation or 
Neither?  
 
A government‘s choice to repress, accommodate and/or ignore protests carries short 
and long-term benefits and costs (see Franklin 2009).  Repression can backfire as it 





as the case of 2011 Egypt protests illustrates.  When used at the outset, repression can 
also end a challenge and discourage protests in the future as case of Bahrain shows 
(Cunningham et al 2017).  
 Another way to swiftly eliminate a protest threat is to accommodate 
protesters‘ demands.  However, accommodation can be costly given the resources 
needed to adequately respond to demands, and this may not be a viable option for a 
government that lack resources.  Accommodation may also encourage future protests, 
so even when a state has resources needed to accommodate demands, it may choose 
not to do so.  In order to offset the costs, governments sometimes choose to respond 
with both accommodation and repression (Lichbach 1987) or substitute one response 
for another in a sequential manner.  Moore (2000) Goldstone and Tilly (2001) 
examine a state‘s choice to substitute repression for accommodation and vice versa 
and provide valuable insight into the dynamic relationship between a state and an 
opposition.   
 Governments may also choose not to respond, neither to accommodate nor 
to repress.  Ignoring protests may be beneficial in some situations as it can lower 
protesters‘ expectations and discourage people to participate in protests (Franklin 
2009).  On the other hand, by not responding, a government may appear vulnerable 
which can encourage more people to join protests.  Also, some protests pose a more 
credible threat and are harder to ignore, so governments are compelled to respond 
either with repression and/or accommodation (Franklin 2009).  Taking into the 
account the costs and benefits of each response, a state‘s choice of action is a 
complex decision-making process that does not only depend on the nature of a regime 
in power, but also protest event related characteristics (see Lichbach 1987; Franklin 





The larger the protest size, the more radical demands are and the more violent 
dissent becomes, the more threatening protest will seem to a government (Tilly, 1978; 
Gartner and Regan 1996; Lichbach 1998; Poe et al 2000).  While a government can 
choose to repress, accommodate or in some cases even ignore these kinds of threats, 
the current literature suggests that government will primarily respond with repression.   
According to the Law of Coercive Responsiveness, threats to a regime‘s 
survival will be repressed (Davenport 2007).  Other researchers take a less definite 
position and suggest that the probability of repression increases/decreases relative to 
protest threat levels; the view referred to as a threat-response theory (Tilly, 1978; 
Gartner and Regan 1996; Poe et al 2000; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003).  Even 
though past research points out that repression decreases once protest demands reach 
very high levels (Gartner and Regan 1996) and that repression is not the most 
common response (Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Franklin 2009), state repression 
still continues to be the focus of the majority of the studies on dissent (Carey 2006; 
Davenport 2007; Hendrix and Salehyan 2016).    
It is plausible that violent challenges, radical demands and a large number of 
participants pose a greater threat to a regime‘s power and compel a state to rely on 
coercive measures to control dissent.  However, it is also to be expected that, when 
faced with dissent, regimes will aim to employ the least costly and most effective 
tactics to respond to protest related threats, and that their choice of action will not 
solely be limited to repression.   
 Protest size is considered to greatly affect a regime‘s response to protests.  
Ryckman (2016) argues that in the case of large, nonviolent movements, governments 
are forced to consider granting concessions because these movements are ―too large 





governments offer concessions at a higher rate when protests have more than 100 000 
participants, with almost two thirds of these protests receiving concessions (p.128).  
In contrast, Lichbach (1998) warns that even small events can have a significant 
impact, with seemingly insignificant events leading to major political uprisings 
(p.114).  It is possible that in some cases, governments will choose to repress even 
small-scale protests out of fear of protest escalation.  For instance, the Cuban 
Government violently repressed a protest by the Ladies in White group in March 
2010, even though only 30 people participated (Israel 2010).  Thus, protest size alone 
may not be sufficient to account for variability in government responses.  It is 
important to note that there are numerous challenges that come with measuring 
protest participation.  Conflicting estimates given by protest organizers and 
governments, large numbers of missing cases particularly for events in rural areas, 
and imprecise estimates such as ―hundreds‖ or ―thousands‖ are some of the issues 
that researches struggle with when seeking to determine protest size (Biggs 2016).  
Thus, it is important to take into account other protest characteristics when examining 
states‘ responses to dissent.     
In addition to protest size, protest demands are also an important indicator of 
protest related threats.  Hendrix and Salehyan (2016) show that protests with political 
and ethno-religious claims are more likely to be repressed when compared to protests 
with economic claims.  Interestingly, Hendrix and Salehyan (2016) also find that even 
though identity-based claims are more threatening for the survival of the regimes in 
Africa, repression is a more risky choice and less likely to be used in countries with a 
history of military factionalism.  As shown in the previous chapters of this thesis, 
unrests along ethnic or religious lines have potential to divide and weaken an 





lead to a conflict on a wider scale (Syria 2011), so repression under these 
circumstances may not be the optimal response.  It is possible that, despite the 
pressures that protests exert on governments, the better option in some cases is to 
refrain from either repression or accommodation.   
While some demands are less radical and easier to accommodate, more radical 
claims such as the calls for regime change are less likely to result in a compromise.  
Gartner and Regan (1996) and Lichbach (1998) find that the more radical demands 
are, the higher the likelihood that they will be rejected and potentially repressed.  
Calls for regime change, in particular in autocracies, may signify life and death 
decisions for some regimes as the cases of 2011 regime overthrow in Tunisia, Libya 
and Egypt illustrate, limiting possibilities for other actions besides repression.  In 
cases where radical demands draw large numbers of people, repression may 
eventually become counterproductive and lead to an overthrow of a regime.  
However, it is also possible that some radical demands fail to mobilize large numbers, 
resulting in protests being less threatening to a regime, and thus, easier to ignore.  
Brancati (2016) finds that a quarter of world-wide electoral claims related protests 
(1989-2011) were ignored despite radical demands precisely because these were 
small-scale protests.  She provides interesting insights into ways in which protest 
demands interact with specific country-related characteristics to condition 
governments‘ perceptions of threat and subsequent choices of action, however, the 
study is primarily focused only on electoral process, and leaving aside other political 
events.  I examine various issues such as rights-related claims, calls for reform, 
regime change demands as well as economy-related issues to offer a wider coverage 





In some instances large numbers (size) can be enough to evoke a desired 
response from a government and in others only specific actions such as the violent 
takeover of government-owned facilities may provoke some — even if negative — 
acknowledgement of grievances (demands).   For instance, the 2009 Bagua protests in 
Perú were initially ignored by the government for a year despite 140 indigenous 
communities and around 5000 participants protesting against the government‘s illegal 
natural resource extraction from indigenous lands (Freedom House 2015, p.51).  The 
Peruvian Government responded with violent repression only after protesters 
occupied state-owned facilities (Freedom House 2015).  In contrast, in less than five 
months and with more than 500 000 participants, the Chilean 2011 nonviolent student 
protest movement managed to secure significant concessions and raise an awareness 
of educational issues on the national level (Freedom House 2015).  In both cases, 
Chile and Perú, the protesters demanded reform of government policies, but the size 
and the tactics differed, which could help explain differences in these two cases.   
Thus, another important element of threat is use of violent and/or nonviolent tactics 
by protesters.   
In terms of the threat levels, both violent and nonviolent protests pose a 
significant threat to a regime‘s status.  Gamson (1975) suggests that violent protests 
pose a greater threat to a regime because of the resources needed to cope with these 
types of challenges.  However, studies have found that nonviolent challenges are two 
times more successful in removing a regime from power in comparison to violent 
ones (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005).  Nonviolent 
protests often mobilize more people and as the number of protest participants 
increases, so does people‘s power to successfully confront a regime.  Thus, large-





protests, but be more risky to repress given the potential backlash against a 
government who confronts nonviolent challenges with violence.    
 Both, violent and nonviolent protests are more common in non-democratic 
states given the inherent problems in these types of the regimes and a lack of option 
to express grievances through official channels such as elections (Schock 2003).  The 
emergence of 2011 mass public protests illustrates the extent of disillusionment with 
the non-democratic political systems and with a lack of possibility of change through 
regular political channels.  Nonetheless, over the last decade both, democracies and 
non-democracies have experienced some type of unrest (Brancati 2016; Clark and 
Regan 2016).  People have voiced their concerns over a variety of issues, ranging 
from global reactions to 2008 financial crisis to a state-level discontent regarding 
educational, environmental and electoral policies.  Governments‘ responses varied 
from excessive use of police force to various forms of concessions, to inaction 
(Freedom House, 2015; Brancati 2016; Clark and Regan 2016). While, both 
democracies and non-democracies employ repressive tactics, democracies are less 
likely to engage in repressive actions in comparison to non-democracies.  
Democracies are expected to guarantee and respect freedoms of assembly and 
expression and be more responsive to their citizens‘ demands (Johnston, 2011).  
Protests in democracies are less likely to be ignored and more likely to be 
accommodated given that these regimes are held accountable to the electorate.  
Instead, protests present a more significant threat to non-democratic regimes given 
that these regimes hold onto power through coercive measures, and so 
accommodation in non-democratic states may be more costly as it would require 





While a government‘s choice of repression or accommodation can be 
understood in terms of strategic and tactical advantages, a choice of ignore presents a 
more complex puzzle.  Is ignoring an attempt to diminish a threat?  Or does it signal 
that a threat doesn‘t need diminishing?  Small-scale protests with minimal demands 
present a low threat to a regime and are probably best to be ignored.  It can be argued 
that such cases may not require a complex decision-making calculation, and a choice 
to ignore may simply represent a lack of threat.  For instance, Klein and Regan 
(forthcoming, p. 36) show that a predicted probability of ignore (disregard) increases 
to 68.3% when both concession and disruption costs are low, while a probability of 
repression and accommodation significantly decreases, with coercion being at 3.1%, 
accommodation 8.5% and crowd dispersal 20.2%.  However, by not responding to a 
low level protest related threats, a regime may appear dismissive of people‘s genuine 
concerns, which in turn can fuel more anger and resentment towards a regime and 
lead to an increase in protest participation (Bishara 2015).  While the rationale behind 
ignoring small-scale protests seems plausible, the benefits of not responding to large-
scale protests may be less apparent.  However, by choosing to ignore large-scale 
protests a state may avoid greater backlash and conflict escalation.  Thus, the 
relationship between the protest size and the ignore choice may be more complex 
than the threat-response theory suggests.  
 With the exception of one cross-country study by Klein and Regan 
(forthcoming) and couple of case studies (Bishara 2015 and Franklin 2009), the 
discussion in the literature often centres on a government‘s choice to either repress or 
accommodate protest demands.  One possible explanation for a lack of attention 
towards the ignore response may relate to issues of data collection and measurement. 





actively ignore protests and the cases where news outlets have not reported on 
governments‘ actions.  In addition, there seems to be a lack of an agreement on how 
to conceptualize the ignore category in the handful of studies that do take into account 
this particular response.  Bishara (2015, p.959) conceptualizes the ignore response 
from a perspective of protest participants, hence, ignore is any government action that 
appears dismissive of protest participants either through inaction or contempt.  On the 
other hand, Cai (2010) and Yien and Cheng (2017) use the concept of tolerance to 
describe a regime which allows and tolerates protests only to be able to easily identify 
dissenters and apply proactive tactics either to discredit or payoff protesters.  Other 
authors tend to define the tolerance/ignore category as an absence of both repression 
and concession (Franklin 2009).  Similarly to Franklin (2009), the MMD codes the 
ignore category as a lack of repressive or accommodative actions (Clark and Regan 
2016).  I rely on the MMD definition, being the inaction/ignore category cases where 
a government chooses neither to repress nor to accommodate.  In the following 
section, I show how the strategic choice to ignore protests can be integrated and 
tested within the theoretical bounds of the Law of the Coercive Responsiveness and 
the threat-response theory. 
4.3 Propositions  
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine government responses beyond repression and 
explore the conditions that increase the probability of repression over accommodation 
or a choice to ignore protest events.  Repression might not be as common as the 
current literature suggests given human and material costs.  Also, not all protest 





into account the variability in government responses and the conditions that increase 
the probability of one response over other.   
Based on the threat-response theory, the larger the protest size the more 
threatening protest will seem to a government, and the higher the likelihood that a 
government will respond with repression. Even though this proposition seems 
plausible, repression may not be the best option in cases when protests are ―too large 
to ignore yet risky to repress‖ (Ryckman, p.5).  Accommodation may be a less risky 
choice in those cases.   On the other hand, at the point when protests are neither too 
small to ignore nor too large to accommodate, the best option to effectively reduce or 
eliminate protest-related threats may be repression.  Thus, it is possible that as the 
protest size increases, so does the likelihood that a government will respond with 
repression, up until a certain point when repression becomes a more risky and a less 
likely choice, and instead, accommodation or a choice to ignore become more viable 
options.  It is also possible that while some protests are best not to be ignored, others 
may be too small to merit a response, and so ignore might be the most optimal choice.   
Thus, it is important to examine alternatives to a state‘s choice of repression.    
.  
Hypothesis 1a: As protest size increases, protests are more likely to be 
repressed than ignored.   
Hypothesis 1b:  As protest size increases, protests are more likely to be 
accommodated than repressed.  
 
The demand type is also an indicator of a threat that a protest event can pose 
to a regime.  In relation to regime change demands, there seems to be an agreement in 
the literature that these pose a significant threat to those in power (White et al. 2015; 





very likely to be repressed.  Interestingly, Hendrix and Salehyan (2016) show that, 
overall, protests with political and ethno-religious demands are more likely to be 
repressed when compared to protests with economic demands. In comparison, 
Brancati (2016) finds that economy related claims have potential to attract the most 
participants and that these claims are more likely to be accommodated.  I propose to 
further test the above findings and contribute to the current literature by taking into 
account a variety of government responses and demands.  
The demands that call for a removal of government official/s present a 
significant threat to a regime and may be more challenging to accommodate or ignore 
in comparison to other demands.  The calls for a regime change are less common than 
other types of the demands, but are more likely to mobilise large groups of people as 
protesters are more confident in expressing this type of radical demand when 
surrounded by a large number of participants.  Demands for institutional and policy 
reforms also present a significant threat, as these are often calls for democratisation.  
These types of demands are more likely to be repressed than accommodated.  In 
comparison to the calls for the regime removal and institutional and policy reforms, 
the production related claims (demands for fair wages, levies, food costs and 
land/farm issues) are potentially more likely to be accommodated as these require less 
institutional changes.  Production related demands, in particular wage-related 
protests, have a potential to mobilize large groups of people so these claims may also 
be less likely to be ignored and more likely to be accommodated (Brancati 2016).  
However, given that production-related claims could potentially mobilize large 
numbers of people and impose significant financial costs, it is also possible that these 
claims may be repressed in order to prevent large-scale mobilisation. On the other 





grievances may only be related to a particular group could be less threatening simply 
because they do not mobilize large numbers, and thus, these demands are most likely 
to be ignored.   The propositions below are designed to test various types of protest 
demands and corresponding government responses.   
 
Hypothesis 2:    Protests that demand a removal of government official/s are 
more likely to be repressed than ignored.  
Hypothesis 3:  Protests that demand institutional and policy reforms are more 
likely to be repressed than accommodated. 
Hypothesis 4: Protests related to production demands are more likely to be 
accommodated than repressed.     
Hypothesis 5:  Protests with rights related demands are more likely to be 
ignored than repressed. 
4.4 Data and Research Design  
 
To test these hypotheses, I rely on the MMD dataset which provides information on 
protest events and government responses for 161 countries between 1990-2014, 
excluding the United States and Israel (Clark and Regan 2016).  The MMD does not 
capture a large variation of protests in terms of duration, but it does capture a large 
variation in protest size and demand type (Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4). The majority of 
the protests (83.9%), last for only one day, 11.8% end within one weeks and 4.3% 
last anywhere from 8-939 days (Klein and Regan forthcoming, p.23).  The country 
with highest number of protests is South Korea (251), followed by Venezuela (200), 





indicating a great variability of in the types of regimes that experience mass 
mobilization within the period of interest.   
The MMD present several advantages compared to NAVCO 2.0 to test the 
theoretical argument. First, the MMD codes independent protest events with a 
threshold of 50 participants, which differs from NAVCO 2.0 campaign event 
threshold where protest events with 1000 or more participants are coded as a part of a 
wider coordinated, purposive and continuous maximalist campaign of resistance 
(Chenoweth and Lewis 2013).  Clark and Regan (2016) argue that 50-participants 
threshold is enough to capture an organized effort by an opposition.  The lower 
threshold of protest size is relevant in this chapter, as it allows me to examine whether 
and how government responds to smaller-scale protest events with fewer than 1000 
participants.  This is helpful for understanding if and how government responses 
present a barrier for an emergence of larger, coordinated and sustained efforts of civil 
resistance, the types of events studied in the Chapter 2 of this thesis.  The MMD data 
also codes large-scale protest events, which helps me test the threat-response theory 
propositions.  Second, I can assess mass mobilization irrespective of its duration, 
given that MMD consider events with a minimum of one day while NAVCO2.0 
aggregates the information to the year.  Finally, in addition to the number of protest 
participants, the MMD provides information on protesters‘ use of violence, demands, 
government responses and numerous other details such as the location and the 
identity of those organizing a protest event (Clark and Regan 2016; Klein and Regan 
forthcoming).   
 Protest related threat indicators such as protest size and types of demands are 
measured at the event level, while control variables in this paper are measured at the 





number of protests in a country-year is included as an event-level control variable 
(Klein and Regan forthcoming).  The more protests a country is experiencing, the 
more challenging it will be for a state to repress numerous protests, making it more 
likely that protests will be ignored or accommodated.   
 
4.4.1 The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is government response.  The government response variable 
in the MMD dataset is coded as a categorical variable with 7 types of government 
responses: accommodation, arrests, beatings, crowd dispersal mechanisms, killings, 
shootings and ignore.  For the purposes of the analysis in this Chapter, the original 
variable is recoded into 3 unordered categories:  ignore (1), repress (2), accommodate 
(3).  The repression category is a combination of: arrests, beatings, crowd dispersal 
mechanisms, killings, and shootings.  Any negotiations, meetings and concessions are 
defined as accommodation response.  The ignore response category identifies cases 
where government‘s choice is neither repression nor accommodation to respond to 
protest events.   
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of these three types of responses and also 
instances where the protest event is inconsistent (mixture of responses to a given 
event) and missing.  The ignore category is by far the most common government 
response, accounting for 52% of all the cases, which stands in contrast to the findings 
in the current literature.  It is possible that number of ignored protest events is even 
larger than Figure 4.2 shows given that protests that get repressed are more likely to 
be reported than those that get ignored.  Repression is the next most common 





responses (6%) and missing cases (14%).  Given that most protest events last about a 
day, the focus in this study is primarily on the cases where government uses 
exclusively one of the responses rather than being inconsistent (responding by using 
both repression and accommodation or ignore).   
Figure 4.1 Frequency of Government Responses (1990-2014) 
 
 
4.4.2 Explanatory Variables 
The main independent variables relate to the characteristics of the protest that 
eventually determine the level of threat they impose on the government.  I define 
threat by the size of protest and the types of demands.  The first independent variable 
of interest is protest size. This variable is a rough estimate of the maximum number 
of protest participants that an event attracted over the course of its duration, grouped 





As before, data comes from the MMD, and as Figure 4.3 shows the majority of the 
protest events falling into the 100-999 and 10 001 – 100 000 protest participant 
category.  The MMD final categorization ends at >10 000 protests, but, given the 
findings by Brancati (2016) which shows that accommodation is the most likely 
option when protests draw more than 10 000 participants, additional category is 
added to separate protests under and above 100 000.  The protest size intervals that 
define categories are broad and dramatically change in size from 10 000 to 100 000, 
however, similar coding rules have been applied by Brancati (2016).  Also, similar 
divisions of protest size is present in the SCAD v.3.1 dataset, which provides yearly 
accounts (1990-2014) of protest events and government responses for all the 
countries in Africa as well as Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean (Salehyan 
et al, 2012). 
The number of cases in the MMD where the protest size is missing comes 
close to 48% of the sample.  These percentages are comparable to the SCAD v.3.1 
dataset missing protest size cases and other studies (Biggs 2016).  However, the 
missing protest size estimates might bias the estimated relationship between protest 
size and government responses.  In particular, the use of repression towards smaller 
protests is likely to be overestimated given that larger protests are likely to be 
reported regardless of being repressed or not.  Given that the MMD contains protest 
events from recent history and protest organizers are often required to inform police 
of their intent to hold the protests, and in some cases, provide an estimate of the 
number of expected participants so that police can provide adequate protection, the 
missing cases cannot be entirely due to reporting styles or a lack of available 





size was not worth mentioning or very contentious so that the government/press 
decided to suppress information on the protest size.   
 
 





The second independent variable is protest demand.  Based on the MMD I 
create a 4 variable distinguishing between (1) the calls for institutional and policy 
reforms (reform); (2) demands for removal of an individual or a group in a 
government (remove); (3) demands for social and political rights (rights); and finally 





Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of these four categories. The demands related to 
reforms are the most common type, accounting for 70% of the cases, followed by 
production, rights and calls for removal of government officials.   
Appendix 6.7 shows the distribution of protest size for each type of demand.  
The 100 – 999 protest size category seems to be the most common protest 
mobilization level across all the demands.  Protest events that call for reform 
primarily mobilize between 100 – 999 and 10 001 – 100 000 participants.   Similar 
trend in mobilization is present for the production and remove related demands.  
Rights related demands tend to mobilize between 100-199 participants, less people in 
comparison to other demands where mobilization levels can reach above 100 000.   
 









4.4.3 Control Variables  
I control for confounders that may affect the response of governments to protests.  In 
particular, I account for regime type, use of violence by protesters, number of protests 
in a country/year, size of urban population and GDP per capita.  Non-democracies are 
expected to primarily employ repression.  I use information from Polity2 (Marshall, 
Keith, and Robert  2016)to create a institutional measure for the regime of a given 
country with a binary indicator that  identifies non-democratic countries as those who 
receive a polity2 score of 5 or less within the 10 (full democracy) to -10 (full 
autocracy) range.   
The MMD provides information on protesters engaging in violence against a 
state which could include any type of violence from riots to destruction of property to 
shooting at the police (Clark and Regan 2016).  The protest violence variable is coded 
as a dichotomous.  I control for protest violence since a regime is more likely repress 
violent protests as it is easier to justify use of repression towards violent than 
nonviolent protests.  I also control for the number of protests in a country/year.  The 
more protests a country is experiencing, the more challenging it will be for a state to 
repress numerous protests, making it more likely that protests will be ignored or 
accommodated.   
Literature on nonviolent mobilization finds that the size of the urban 
population in a country is positively related to protest onset (Chenoweth and Stephan 
2011; Dahl, et al. 2014).  Therefore, I control for the size of urban population as a 
factor that may influence government response to protest using the updated data, 
1948-2014 from Gleditsch (2002) project.  Finally, I control for the economic 





that richer non-democracies are expected to be  more repressive. Both variables, GDP 
per capita and urban population are logged due to severe nonlinearity.  
Given the nature of the dependent variable government response, I estimate a  
multinomial logit model with standard errors clustered by country to model 
government response to protest events as a state chooses between a set of alternatives; 
to ignore, repress or accommodate a protest event (Venables and Ripley 2002).  The 
multinomial logit model assumes that these are plausibly distinct choices, meaning 
that a relative choice does not depend on what other available choices are.  In other 
words, a state‘s choice of repression won‘t change regardless weather 
accommodation or ignore is an option or not.  A state‘s choice of an action is a part of 
a deliberate and strategic decision-making process, and so a choice to repress a 
protest do not necessarily depend on whether accommodation or ignore are available 
choices or not.   For instance, a state might choose to use available resources to 
repress rather than accommodate regardless of how easy or difficult it would be to 
concede to protesters demands.  This property of the multinomial logit is known as 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).  The tests such as Hausman-
McFadden and Small-Hsiao are often used to test IIA assumption.  Cheng and Long 
(2007) run a series of Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate these tests and conclude 
that the performance is unsatisfactory.  Klein and Regan (forthcoming) come to a 
similar conclusion.  Cheng and Long (2007) suggest that the structure of the 
independent variables affects both tests.  Allison (2012) proposes that in the models 
where one or more predictors are categorical, IIA tests are not useful. The model in 






4.5 Results  
 
Table 4. 1 provides a set of regression coefficients where 2 levels of government 
responses – ignore and accommodation responses are compared to a baseline 
category repress.  Repression response is used as a baseline category in order to test 
the threat-response theory propositions, which suggest that protest events on a low 
scale of contention (e.g. small protests) are more likely to be ignored, while those on 
a high scale of contention (e.g. large protests) are more likely to be repressed.  In 
addition, the baseline repression allows for comparisons between repression and 
accommodation which is a question of great interest in the academic, activist and 





Table 4.1 Multinomial Logit Model 
 
 
Government Response: ignore, accommodate, repress (baseline category) 
 
ignore accommodate ignore accommodate ignore accommodate ignore accommodate 
 








































































































































     



















(0.107) (0.222) (0.106) (0.223) (0.117) (0.226) (0.119) (0.230) 

































(0.034) (0.057) (0.034) (0.057) (0.038) (0.059) (0.039) (0.061) 








(0.316) (0.528) (0.326) (0.548) (0.343) (0.526) (0.390) (0.603) 
N                                 4997             4997 4997 4997 4997 4997 4997 4997 









Based on the results in Figures 4.2, 4.5, 4.6 and the Table 4.1, ignore category 
is more common than repression, contradicting the Law of Coercive Responsiveness 
which claims that repression is the expected response to dissent.  The results also 
challenge the assumptions of the threat-response theory which states that repression 
increases with an increase in threat levels (increase in protest size).  The results in 
Table 4.1, Model 1 and Model 7, show the opposite – as protest size increases, 
governments are more likely to ignore than repress protest events.   The analyses in 
this chapter bring into question the Law of Coercive Responsiveness and the threat-
response theory propositions and reveal that repression is not as common as the 
current literature suggests.   
Model 1 shows that governments are likely to choose to ignore than repress 
protests when the size of protests goes above 100 participants.  Model 7, which in 
addition to the regime type, urban population and the GDP per capita also controls for 
whether the protests were violent or not shows that governments are likely to ignore 
than repress protest events with 1000 or more participants.  Model 7 confirms that 
nonviolent protests that reach above 1000 participants are more likely to be ignored 
than repressed.  The results in Model 1 and 7 do not provide support for Hypothesis 





size increases.  The choice to ignore rather than repress protest events as their size 
increases is consistent across the models.  This is contrary to the current literature, in 
particular, the threat-response theory which suggests that repression increases with an 
increase in threat levels, measured as an increase in protest size numbers.  It is 
important to note that events that get repressed are more likely to have the number of 
participants reported by the press than those that get ignored, thus, the missing data 
should skew the bias towards the repress category and overestimate the use of 
repression rather than overestimate the use of ignore option.  These results suggest 
that it is also important to take into account the types of protest demands in addition 
to protest size when evaluating governments‘ responses.   
Models 2 and 8 provide support for Hypothesis 1b which proposes that as the 
protest size increases, protests are more likely to be accommodated than repressed.  
Model 2 results indicate that accommodation becomes a more likely choice when 
compared to repression once protests reach 5000 participants.     
 Model 3 shows that demands for removal of government officials are more 
likely to be ignored.  This finding is contrary to the expectations and does not provide 
support for Hypothesis 3.  Interestingly, these results change to non-significant once 
the model 7 controls for the type of the protest.   
 The results in Model 4 and 8 show that protests that demand reforms are more 
likely to be repressed than accommodated which provides support for Hypothesis 3.   
The results in Models 4 and 8 also provide support for Hypothesis 4 which proposes 
that protests with production related demands are more likely to be accommodated 
than repressed.   
 The results in Model 3 and 7 do not provide support for Hypothesis 5.  The 





Model 3.  The results become non-significant once the Model 7 controls for whether 
the protests were violent or not.   Rights related demands that become or are violent 
from the start are most likely separatist demands.  These types of demands are not 
coded in the MMD data, and this might help explain non-significant results.   
The expectation that governments are less likely to repress protests in 
countries with a larger percentage of urban population was not supported by the 
results, showing the opposite, with the repression being more likely than ignore and 
accommodation options.  The effects of the GDP per capita  were as expected in 
relation to repression, with richer non-democracies being more repressive, but less 
clear in relation to accommodation, with the results being non-significant (Models 2, 
4, 6, 8).   
Table 4. 1 presents the significance levels and the direction of the effect 
explanatory variables have on government response.  In order to better understand the 
relationship between protest characteristics and government responses, I estimate 
substantive effects for the two main independent variables (protest size and demands).  
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the predicted probabilities for each category of the 
dependent variable (government response), while holding constant urban population, 
GDP per capita and N protests their means and other variables at median (regime 
type, use of violence), with 95% confidence intervals.  
Figure 4.5 shows that the predicted probability of a government‘s choice to 
ignore protests increases with protest size (55% to 76%), while the probability of 
repression decreases as protests get bigger (37% to 16%).  There does not appear to 
be a clear pattern regarding the use of accommodation in relation to protest size and 





Figure 4.6 indicates that the production related demands have the highest 
probability of being ignored when compared to other demands, while rights related 
demands are least likely to be ignored.  In contrast, predicted probability of repression 
is highest for rights related demands (37%), followed by calls for a removal of regime 
officials (32%), reform related demands (26%) and production having the lowest 
probability of being repressed (22%).  The production related demands are most 
likely to be accommodated when compared to other demands.  Figures 4.5 and 4.6 
show that ignore and repress options are utilized by governments more so than 
accommodation, with ignore still being the most dominant category across the all 
protest size categories and all demands.   
The results in this chapter provide insights into governments‘ perceptions of 
threat levels in relation to protest events and distinct cost-benefit calculations when it 
comes to choosing one type of response over others.  The results indicate that 
governments are more likely to overall ignore majority of the protests in hope to 









Figure 4.4. Predicted probabilities of government responses across protest size 


















Figure 4.5 Predicted probabilities of government responses across protest demand 







4.6 Robustness Checks  
Lichbach (1987) and (Rasler 1996) examine a government‘s choice to respond to 
protests with a combination of tactics and refer to it as the inconsistency category.  
They both find that find that a government inconsistency increase dissent.  The 
inconsistency category is used in this study as a robustness check (see Appendix 6.9).  
The results do not significantly change with inclusion of the inconsistency category in 
relation to the ignore-repression comparison.  The only difference in these analyses 
appears to be in the ignore-accommodation category in relation to the protest size.  
Governments are more likely to accommodate small and large scale protests, while 
the results are non-significant for medium range protests (2000-10 000).     
 The ethnic diversity index (ED), based on the EPR 2014 dataset (Vogt et al. 
2015) was included as another robustness check.  Ethnic divisions in a country shape 
government responses to protest events.   Hendrix and Salehyan (2016) show that 
ethno-religious claims are less likely to be repressed by regimes with a history of 
military factionalism. The authors suggest that potentials for backlash and divisions 
within regimes‘ structures are greater in these types of regimes, and so repression is a 
risky choice.  Similarly, I argue that in cases where population is divided along ethnic 
lines, nonviolent protests could escalate into violent conflict if a government chooses 
to respond with repression as the example of Syria suggests.  Even if nonviolent, 
mass scale mobilisation presents security risks in ethnically divided states.  In such 
cases, governments might refrain from using repression to avoid conflict escalation as 
well as to evade risks of being removed from power.  Thus, it is possible that in 
ethnically diverse and divided states, governments are less likely to repress and more 
likely to either ignore or accommodate protest demands.  This could skew the results 





additional robustness checks (see Appendix 6.10).  The results do not significantly 
change with inclusion of the ED index in relation to the ignore-repression 
comparison.  The only difference in these analyses appears to be in the ignore-
accommodation category in relation to the protest size.   When controlling for the ED, 
governments are more likely to accommodate small and large scale protests, while the 
results are non-significant for medium range protests (2000-10 000).   
4.7 Discussion 
 
This chapter provides a systematic analysis of government responses to protest events 
and extends the existing frameworks on protests and state responses.  The dissent-
state response discourse in the current literature is predominantly shaped by the Law 
of Coercive Responsiveness and the threat-response theory. This chapter questions 
the applicability of these frameworks by incorporating other government responses 
such as ignore and accommodate category.   
While both, the Law of Coercive Responsiveness and the threat-response 
theory rely heavily on drawing a relationship between protest threats and 
governments‘ use of repression they seem to ignore some and favour other 
dimensions of protest related threats.  They define threat as a visible physical 
manifestation of protest numbers (protest size) and protesters‘ pursuit of radical 
demands such as regime change.   The idea is that the larger the protest size, the more 
threatening protest event and the higher likelihood that a state will respond with 
repression (Tilly 1978).   While the number of protest participants is a valid indicator 
of possible threats that the protesters pose to a regime‘s power, there are other types 
of threats that are less visible, but possibly equally challenging to those in power.  For 





by a large and diverse coalition of individuals and organizations, who, in addition to 
coming out to the streets in large numbers, were able to develop stable and resistant 
networks that eventually proved to be as important as the numbers of protest 
participants  (Boudreau 2000).   Well-organized networks and effective leadership 
can present a great level of threat to a regime in power.   
Demands and protest size shape governments‘ perceived levels of threat to a 
certain level.  However, what current literature and available data lacks is a more 
detailed assessment of organizations and networks involved in anti-regime resistance.  
In my future work, I plan to incorporate information on organizational structures that 
facilitate and sustain protest activities.   The main aim of this chapter was to fill the 
gap in the current literature by investigating variability of government responses, in 
particular the ignore category, in a more systematic and empirical manner.   
In addition to the data collection and variable operationalization issues (threat 
levels),   the studies on protests and state responses suffer from a serious problem of 
endogeneity.   Protest events and state repression can be a cause and a consequence of 
each other.  For instance, if a state chooses to repress a particular protest event, and if 
the repression backfires, more people will join protest activities, which leads to an 
increase in protest size.  Given the unit of analysis in this study, event-country-year, 
the endogeneity might not be a problem in this study.  The MMD data codes an 
emergence of an independent protest event and a government reaction to each 
particular event.  There can be more than 1 protest event that emerges in a country in 
a day/week/month/year, and a government response for each event is coded 
accordingly.  Also, protest events in this study emerge for a short period of time, with 





direct relationship: protest action – government reaction.  Thus, the feedback effect, 
action-reaction, is not an issue in this study. 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter shows that a regime‘s choice to ignore protests is more common than 
both repression and accommodation.  The findings bring into questions both, the Law 
of the Coercive Responsiveness which claims that repression is inevitable,, and the 
threat-response theory which claims that repression increases with increase in threat 
levels.  Protest size is considered to be an indicator of threat levels, and thus, 
according to the threat-response theory, an increase in the number of protest 
participants should lead to an increase in use of repression.  The results in this chapter 
show otherwise – ignore is the most dominant category.   
 The findings show that a government‘s choice to ignore protests, is a very 
common response to protest events, in particular when protest increases in size 
(number of participants).  Interestingly, regimes are also more likely to ignore 
protests that call for a removal of state officials.   
 In this chapter I show that governments have a repertoire of choices and 
may decide to ignore mass mobilization more frequently than repress and/or 
accommodate it.  The results show that protest size and the type of demands affect 
governments‘ responses to dissent.  In particular, an increase in protest size has a 
positive effect on a probability of ignoring and a negative effect on a probability of 
government repression.  This is consistent with the literature on costs of repression, 






 In addition, results show the importance of distinguishing between the types 
of demands as a proxy for how threatened a government must feel by the popular 
mobilization.  Demands for rights are more likely to be repressed when compared to 
calls for a removal of government officials.   It is possible that rights related claims 
are more likely to be met with repression when compared to other responses because 
governments tend to consistently target particular groups that express rights-related 
grievances.  Groups with limited political and social rights are more likely to be 
targeted by a government and likely to be successfully repressed given their already 
weak position in a society.  Instead, calls for a removal of government officials and 
reform may be more likely to be ignored because these demands can potentially 
mobilize more people given the cross-cutting nature of the grievances.  Production 
related claims (wages, taxes and land regulations) seem to be least threatening and, 
thus, are more likely to be accommodated than ignored.   
 While repression has been considered the dominant strategy in response to 
dissent, the literature on government responses also points out to the negative 
consequences of repression and how this affects the rational calculation for choosing 
this response.  Even so,  this is one of the first studies in the current literature that 
shows that government may instead decide to ignore protests in the hope that this 
response will generate less costs than the alternatives (repress or accommodate).  In 
other words, a choice to ignore protest demands is a part of a strategic government 
action and when examined together with accommodation and repression, provides a 
more complete understanding of government actions towards protest events.   
 Thus, this chapter contributes to the current literature by providing 





create a particular set of conditions under which governments are more or less likely 



































































This PhD thesis explores barriers to nonviolent resistance and state responses to 
dissent.  Nonviolent resistance tactics are being frequently used to overthrow 
oppressive and corrupt leaders around the globe.   The surge in protest mobilization in 
2011 had even prompted Time magazine to declare ―The Protester‖ to be the Person 
of the Year (Stengel 2011).  The belief that change is possible through collective 
action plays an important role in social and political life of both, individuals and 
states.  Thus, barriers that prevent people from engaging in a collective resistance 
against an abusive and repressive state apparatus are worthy of a scholarly pursuit.  In 
this thesis I explore ethnic divisions, as one of the barriers to nonviolent mobilization.  
I also examine a wide range of state responses to dissent to fill the gap in the current 
literature that primarily focuses on a government‘s use of repression in relation to 
dissent.   
The second chapter of this thesis connects political psychology, collective 
action and protest literature to examine factors that affect coordination and 
cooperation efforts when initiating large-scale nonviolent campaigns against a state.  
It also connects studies on nonviolent campaigns with the literature on ethnicity.  We 
argue that a lack of common ties and existence of ethnic cleavages makes cooperation 
more difficult, resulting in additional barriers for mass mobilization in ethnically 
diverse non-democracies.  While an alliance of ethnically diverse groups is possible, 
forming a coalition in cases where negative intergroup perceptions stem from decades 
of ethnically-based depravations has proven to be a challenging task – the case of 
2011 uprisings in Syria turning into a civil war.  Large scale, organized, purposive 





non-democracies as these types of regimes have a potential to deepen inter-group 
animosities.  Access to power and resources in non-democracies is largely organized 
along ethnic lines and these types of conditions can only worsen ethnic group 
relations and collective action potentials.  
We find that that ethnic diversity alone does not negatively affect nonviolent 
campaign onset and that the effect of ethnicity is conditional on the regime type.  The 
results show that the nonviolent campaign onset is less likely in ethnically diverse 
non-democracies.  The second chapter contributes to the current literature on protest 
in the following ways: 1) shows that ethnicity plays a significant role in other 
political contexts besides violent conflict – namely nonviolent mass mobilization;    
2) ethnic divides have a potential to affect cooperation and coordination needed for 
the emergence of nonviolent anti-regime campaigns; 3) proposes that ethnicity should 
be considered in the literature on nonviolent dissent as an important organizational 
type of structure that can either be a resource or a curse for those who seek to initiate 
a nonviolent resistance against a state.   
Nonviolent resistance campaigns attract various individuals, organizations and 
civil society groups.  The participants differ in terms of their interests, resources, and 
commitments to campaign goals.  The dynamics through which these actors 
overcome their diverging views and come to a common understanding of grievances 
and goals is not well explored in the current literature.  The deliberation over 
strategies and tactics is an important part of building a nonviolent civil resistance 
campaign, yet the existing datasets do not provide information on how various 
participants form coalitions and leadership structures that spearhead a campaign.  The 
current literature lacks theoretical and empirical discussion about ways in which 





the chapter two provide a broad comparison between regime type and ethnic 
diversity, but a detailed knowledge of the type of organisations involved would help 
better explain why some campaigns succeed to overcome coordination problems 
while others fail. Organisational level data could also help provide a better 
understanding on why ethnicity matters more in some contexts and not others.  It 
could also help policy makers and activists discern which types of organisations are 
better suited to overcome collective action problems.  In my future work I plan to 
focus more on organisational level data. In particular, I plan to utilise the 
Governmental Incompatibilities Data Project (GIDP) dataset, which seeks to provide 
cross-country information on organizations making maximalist claims over 
government during the 1960-2012 period (Cunningham et al. 2017).  
The third chapter of this thesis focuses on government framing of protest events.  
Governments rely on various tactics to undermine and effectively demobilize 
protests. Physical acts of repression, accommodation and/or ignoring are often 
accompanied or preceded by various statements made by regime officials regarding 
protest participants or their demands.  Even though government officials often 
intimidate and discredit protests by issuing dismissive, condescending or threatening 
statements, these verbal acts are rarely studied in the current protest literature.   In 
addition, the protest framing theories are mainly developed from the perspective of 
protest participants.  The framing literature contains a vast amount of work that 
discusses framing processes and steps that protest activists take to mobilize the 
masses, but it does not offer much insight into government frames of protest events.  
Given that governments have a considerable advantage in spreading information, 





mobilization.  Thus, in third chapter I examine the types of government frames and 
discuss how these could potentially relate to protest mobilization levels. 
I focus on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina to examine the government 
frames that emerged as a response to 2014 spring protests, propose a categorization of 
these frames and discuss potential effects of government framing on protest 
participation.   I collect my own data using the INFOBIRO (2015) database, a source 
of news reports in the local language that were published during the spring of 2014.  I 
use topic models, automated text analysis approach, to discover the narratives 
(frames) that have emerged during the protest period.  I find that the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina‘s officials have predominantly used the following types of frames:  
delegitimizing (ex. calling protesters traitors, hooligans), demobilizing (sympathetic 
statements – ex. saying that protests are justified), and alternative views 
(sidelining/ignoring grievances by discussing more salient issues).   
The government officials from the Republic of Srpska, one of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina‘s entities (areas) have primarily used the types of frames that shift the 
discussion from protest related grievances to a more salient ethnic issue such as the 
independence and autonomy of the Republic of Srpska (alternative views).  In 
contrast, the officials from the other Bosnia and Herzegovina‘s entity, the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina have used delegitimizing and sympathizing types of 
frames to respond to 2014 spring protests.  This difference in the types of frames 
presents an interesting puzzle since the number of protest events and protest 
participant in the Republic of Srpska was much lower in comparison to the Federation 
entity.   The relationship between the government frames and protest mobilization 
levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina is primarily discussed in exploratory terms, with an 





was to uncover the types of discourses surrounding protest events (topics/frames) and 
propose categorization of government frames as this is something that is missing in 
the current literature on dissent.   
While 2014 protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina are well-suited to study the 
effects of ethnic divides on protest mobilisation, the country‘s unique political and 
territorial structure presents challenges for comparative analyses.  This issue could be 
remedied by taking into account variables such elections, incumbent years in an 
office and influence that government officials have over media.   In my future work, I 
plan to examine if and how the proposed types of government frames can be applied 
to other cases.   
The fourth and final analysis chapter examines government responses to 
protest events.  Similarly to the chapter two, it provides a systematic empirical 
analysis of the cases of interest, but it focuses on various types of protest events, 
while chapter two only examines large-scale nonviolent campaigns.  The fourth 
chapter examines government responses and their perception of protest threat levels 
which can range from protest events that mobilize 50 people to the protests that 
mobilize above 10 000 and up to 1 million participants.  The aim is to widen and test 
the propositions in the current literature on what constitutes a threat by incorporating 
other types of regime responses in addition to repression.  The current literature 
considers repression to be the most common choice and it rarely acknowledges the 
possibility of government ignoring protest demands.   The choice to accommodate 
protest demands has received some attention in the current literature, but not as nearly 
as much as repression.   
I find that, contrary to the claims in the literature, a choice to ignore protests is 





that governments are more likely to ignore protests with 1000 or more participants, 
and more likely to accommodate than repress protests above 5000.  When it comes to 
the type of the protest demands, governments are more likely to repress protest events 
that call for rights for minorities and excluded groups in comparison to other types of 
demands. This finding is particularly relevant for the protest organisers as it indicates 
that rights related protests require a greater amount of resources to withstand 
repression.  One way to diminish a threat of government repression would be to 
initially demand less radical changes (ex. labour and wages) and progressively 
increase pressure on governments to improve rights of aggrieved groups.  In addition, 
policy makers who work on the advancement of human rights could potentially 
consider introducing additional protective mechanisms for marginalized groups and 
minorities whose right to protest is often violated.  Thus, the findings in this chapter 
provide important insights into protest characteristics and government responses that 
could be useful to academics and activists.   
To conclude, the findings in this thesis provide insights into barriers to 
nonviolent civil resistance as well as state responses to protest related challenges.  
The second chapter demonstrates that ethnicity matters in other political contexts 
besides civil war and violent uprisings.  Ethnicity also plays an important role in 
nonviolent conflict, namely presenting a barrier for initiation of large-scale 
nonviolent resistance against a regime.  Ethnic divides increase cost of cooperation 
and present a barrier for mass resistance, in particular in non-democratic states.  The 
third chapter further explores the role of ethnic divides and shows how these could 
potentially be used to undermine nonviolent mobilization.  This chapter also provides 
valuable insights into verbal responses (frames) that governments use to respond to 





government responses and dissent by taking into consideration a long ignored 
category – a government‘s choice to ignore protest events.   
Most importantly, this thesis illustrates negative effects of ethnic divides and 
the ways in which exploitation of the salient ethnic categories can pose a national and 
international security risks. In countries where ethnicity trumps grievances such as 
poverty, unemployment, and inequality, the potentials for intergroup conflict 
escalation are high.  Initiating mass mobilization, even nonviolent resistance, in 
societies where one‘s identity comes before one‘s financial and personal security is a 
highly risky action.  The example of Syria should be a warning to policy makers and 
activists of the dangers that mass mobilization of people poses in countries where 
ethnicity is politicized.  The recommendation for policy makers and activists who 
seek a change is to first develop stable organizational structures and networks that 
involve diverse groups of people before engaging in any type of a confrontation with 
a more powerful and better informed state apparatus.   
The final policy recommendation of this thesis is for the activists and 
lawmakers who seek to protect people‘s rights of assembly and association is to 
observe and understand various tactics that governments employ to diminish dissent.   
While protesters are rightfully fearful of a more powerful state apparatus, repressive 
tactics are not the only way in which governments can undermine dissent.  For 
instance, governments around the world are increasingly using anti-protest laws to 
deter protest activities.  These types of actions are becoming more common responses 
to protest actions in democracies as well as non-democracies according to the 
Freedom House 2015 report.  Changes in protest laws can also reflect a state‘s 
perception of the threat and present a novel dimension to be explored within the 





other types of government responses in order to positively influence policy debate 
and successfully engineer a wider societal change.    
Dissent generates thought-provoking debates as movement participants and 
authorities contest their actions and goals in a public sphere.  Activists face numerous 
moral and political dilemmas as they engage in a deliberation over strategies and 
tactics of resistance.  Similarly, authorities are forced to reflect upon their course of 
action as they respond to uprisings.  This thesis explores conditions that shape protest 
events using a mixture of analytical approaches, supervised (logistic regression) and 
unsupervised models (topic models) to achieve its research aims.  This thesis also 





















Appendix 6. 1 Onset of nonviolent campaigns (NVC) in a country-year, ethnic 
diversity (ED) levels and regime type (polity2 scores).  The y axis presents 
country codes and years where we observe the onset of nonviolent campaign.  
The x axis presents the levels of ethnic diversity (0-lowest, 1-highest).  The y 
axis is ordered by the values of x axis. The colour of the dots indicates the regime 










Appendix 6.2 Robustness Check. Onset of nonviolent campaigns (NVC) in a country-
year, with Freedom House (FH) civil liberties scores.   
FH_1 is a baseline category - wide range civil liberties protected. FH_2 weaker protection.FH_3, 4, 5 
moderate protection.  FH_6 very restricted civil liberties.  FH_7 have few or no civil liberties, no 
freedom of expression or association, no protection of the rights of detainees.  
 
Dependent variable: NVC onset (0/1) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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(0.220) (0.220) (1.600) (1.600) (1.700) (1.700) 
Observations 4,658 4,658 4,658 4,658 4,658 4,658 
Log Likelihood -334.000 -333.000 -303.000 -303.000 -300.000 -300.000 












Appendix 6.3 Onset of nonviolent campaigns (NVC) in a country-year with cubic 




Dependent variable: NVC onset (0/1) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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(0.072) (0.073) (0.071) (0.071) 
GDP per capita log   
-0.167
*
 0.016 0.057 0.053 
   
(0.100) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
t -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
t ^ 2 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.0001 -0.00004 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
t ^ 3  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
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(0.294) (0.294) (0.885) (1.046) (1.174) (1.176) 
Observations 6,203 6,203 6,203 6,203 6,203 6,203 
Log Likelihood -390.491 -390.025 -377.638 -369.968 -366.192 -365.829 
















Appendix 6.4 The dominant topics in the corpus and the three most prominent topic 
words.  Purple indicates translation from Bosniak/Croat/Serbian into English 
Language.  
 
Topic 1 Top Words: RS independence 
  Highest Prob: Dodik, president, peoples, emphasized, pointed out, FBH, Milorad 
FREX: confidence, independence, international, Dodik, pointed out, Banjaluci,   
referendum 
  Lift: analysis, autonomy, Drini, energetic, euro, fund, church 
Topic 2 Top Words: BH GOV supports protests 
  Highest Prob: FBH, protests, Izetbegovic, president, Komsic, protests, presidency 
  FREX: program, Vucic, Komsic, needed, meeting, injustice, Milanovic 
  Lift: line, conflict, corruption, inter-ethnic, inter-religious, peaceful, national 
Topic 3 Top Words: FBH GOV discredits protests 
  Highest Prob: government, cantons, citizens, police, demonstrators, government, 
  FREX: Nefic, Lipovaca, Konjuha, last night, street, workers, drugs 
  Lift: hungry, spokesperson, rowdy, Konjuha, traffic, found, last night 
Topic 4 Top Words:  elections  
  Highest Prob: elections, Dodik ,RSu , RSa , fbih , elections , election 
  FREX: RSU , extraordinary , choice, associate, RSa, elections, opposition 
  Lift: executive, maintain, trying, transferring, engagement, central, guarantees 
Topic 5 Top Words: protesters actions 
Highest Prob: government, citizens, FBH, presidency, building, demonstrator,  
cantons 
  FREX: zdk, municipality, fire, demonstrators, attack, outside, cantonal 
  Lift: give, main, citizen, come out, Kalesiji, Marsala 
Topic 6 Top Words:  international community 
  Highest Prob: Sarajevo, community, international police, HDZ,  
  FREX: paddi , Ashdown , Bosna , transferred , Radoncic 
  Lift: affirmed , actors , alternative , anti-bureaucratic , Ashdown  
Topic 7 Top Words: RS GOV discredits protests 
  Highest Prob: republic, srpska, government, Dodik, republic, srpska, citizens 





  Lift: nongovernmental, theory, conspiracy, argument, Dodikov‘s, traitors 
Topic 8 Top Words: international community 
  Highest Prob: protest , government , citizens , mujkic , protests , politicians , citizens 
  FREX: Mujkic ,kim, Asim , Inzko , politicians , democracy , presidenc 
  Lift: furniture ,Inzko , the possible , the next , incredibly , presidency , subas 
Topic 9 Top Words: security 
  Highest Prob: sda , security , Kapun , Minister , Radoncic , izetbegov , home  
  FREX: security, Radoncic , Minister, home, resignation, resig 
  Lift: Radoncic , dismissed, bevanda , davolom , electrical compnay, formed , voted 
Topic 10 Top Words: RS war veterans 
  Highest Prob: citizens, RSa, protest, government, protest, fighters, power 
  FREX: elements, communities, return, soldiers, veterans ,labor , came 
  Lift: former, work, anger, especially, huge ,pomcari, kind 
Bosniak/Croat/Serbian Language 
Topic 1 Top Words: 
  Highest Prob: dodik, predsjednik, naroda, naglasio, istakao, fbih, milorad 
  FREX: povjerenj, samostalnost, medunarodnog, dodik, naglasio, banjaluci, referendum  
  Lift: analizu, autonomiju, drini, energetik, evra, fonda, hramu 
  Score: aktivno, aldin, alij, analizira, analizu, angazovanj, angazovanju 
Topic 2 Top Words: 
  Highest Prob: fbih, protesta, izetbegov, predsjednik, komsic, protesti, predsjednistva 
  FREX: program, vucic, komsic, trebao, sastanka, nepravd, milanov 
  Lift: crtu, konflikt, lopovluka, meduetnicki, medureligijskog, mirnih, nacionalnog 
  Score: agencijama, aldin, alij, analizira, analizu, angazovanj, angazovanju 
Topic 3 Top Words: 
  Highest Prob: vlade, kantona, gradana, policija, demonstranata, vlada, policij 
  FREX: nefic, lipovaca, konjuha, sinoc, ulici, radnicima, droga 
  Lift: gladn, glasnogovornik, izgrednika, konjuha, prometa, pronadena, sinoc 
  Score: agencijama, aktivno, aldin, alij, analizira, analizu, angazovanj 
Topic 4 Top Words:  
  Highest Prob: izbora, dodik, rsu, rsa, fbih, izbori, izbor 
  FREX: rsu, vanrednih, izbora, vanredni, rsa, izbori, opozicij 
  Lift: izvrsnog, odrz, pokusava, preno, angazovanju, centralna, garancij 
  Score: agencijama, aktivno, aldin, alij, analizira, analizu, angazovanj 
Topic 5 Top Words: 
  Highest Prob: vlade, gradana, fbih, predsjednistva, zgrade, demonstranti, kantona 
  FREX: zdk, opstin, pozar, demonstranti, napad, ispr, kantonaln 
  Lift: dajt, glavnog, gradanin, gradanki, izaci, kalesiji, marsala 
  Score: agencijama, aktivno, aldin, alij, argument, bacali, bacila 
Topic 6 Top Words:  international community 
  Highest Prob: sarajevu, zajednic, medunarodn, policija, hdz, tim, njegov 
  FREX: britanski, lord, paddi, ashdown, hercegovci, prebacio, radoncicu 
  Lift: afirmiral, akterima, alternativcima, alternativn, antibirokratska, ashdown, ashdownu 
  Score: afirmiral, agencijama, akterima, alternativcima, alternativn, analizira, antibirokratska 
Topic 7 Top Words: 
  Highest Prob: republik, srpske, vlast, dodik, republici, srpskoj, gradana 
  FREX: republik, srpske, neprijatelja, mnogi, zavjer, pricu, republici 
  Lift: nevladinih, teorija, zavjer, argument, dodikova, izdajnici, izdajnicima 
  Score: agencijama, aktivno, aldin, alij, analizira, analizu, angazovanj 
Topic 8 Top Words: 
  Highest Prob: protesta, vlasti, gradana, mujkic, protesti, politicari, gradani 
  FREX: mujkic, kim, asim, incko, politicari, demokratij, predsjednistvu 
  Lift: garnitura, inzka, mogucoj, naredna, nevjerovatno, predsjednistvu, subas 
  Score: agencijama, aktivno, aldin, alij, analizira, analizu, angazovanj 
Topic 9 Top Words: 
  Highest Prob: sda, sigurnosti, radonc, ministra, radoncica, izetbegov, domu 
  FREX: sigurnosti, radoncica, ministra, domu, smjeni, radonc, smjenu 
  Lift: radoncicev, smijenjen, bevanda, davolom, elektroprenosu, formirao, glasal 
  Score: afirmiral, agencijama, akterima, aktivno, aldin, alij, alternativcima 
Topic 10 Top Words: 





Appendix 6.5 Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina with territorial divisions: Republic of  








Appendix 6. 6 Top 20 countries with highest numbers of protest events based on the 





































Appendix 6.9 Robustness Checks.  Multinomial Logit.  Government Responses: ignore, accommodate, repress (baseline category). 
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